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1. INTRODUCTION 
Bangladesh is a lower riparian nation located in the Ganges 
Delta of the Indian subcontinent.  It faces staggering challenges in 
its attempts to provide a burgeoning population1 with sanitary 
water for consumption and agriculture.  Despite the abundance of 
freshwater in the region in the form of surface water2 and 
groundwater, Bangladesh faces significant obstacles in leveraging 
these resources.3  Part of the reason is historical.  British colonial 
rulers did little to develop water resources in East Bengal and this 
neglect has proved difficult to surmount.4 
Due to its location at the mouth of a 1560-mile (2510-kilometer) 
river basin5 settled by over 350 million people,6 Bangladesh has 
 
1 In 2009, Bangladesh‘s population increased by 1.4% to over 162 million 
people.  Population, Total, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
/SP.POP.TOTL (last visited Mar. 15, 2011); Population Growth (Annual %), WORLD 
BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW (last visited Mar. 15, 
2011). 
2 Approximately 230 rivers are scattered throughout the country.  FOOD & 
AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IRRIGATION IN ASIA IN FIGURES 49 (1999).  
Bangladesh has an average annual surface water flow of about 1073 million acre 
feet; approximately 93% of this water comes from India via rivers, and the 
remaining 7% comes from rainfall.  Surface Water, BANGLAPEDIA: NATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANGLADESH, http://bpedia.org/S_0614.php (last visited Mar. 
15, 2011).  See generally Water Profile of Bangladesh, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARTH (Mar. 
30, 2007, 8:34 PM), http://www.eoearth.org/article/Water_profile_of 
_Bangladesh. 
3 Bangladesh possesses natural resources in quantities that typically correlate 
to agricultural abundance and prosperity, but, as one observer puts it, this seems 
merely a ―cruel paradox‖ in the face of the country‘s extreme poverty.  Tauhidul 
A. Khan, Management and Sharing of the Ganges, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 455, 458 
(1996). 
4 See id. at 459 (noting, as an example, the failure of British colonial rulers to 
develop infrastructure enabling irrigation). 
5 Ganges River, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com 
/EBchecked/topic/225359/Ganges-River (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
6 G. TYLER MILLER & SCOTT SPOOLMAN, LIVING IN THE ENVIRONMENT: 
PRINCIPLES, CONNECTIONS, AND SOLUTIONS 538 (16th ed. 2009) (discussing pollution 
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surface water that is teeming with harmful microorganisms and 
other pollutants.  Floods are a major contributor to this pollution.  
Around 70% of Bangladesh‘s surface is underwater during the 
monsoon season, between June and September.7  The monsoons, 
aside from destroying crops and property, effectively render the 
country a ―connected sewer.‖8  Because of limitations in 
Bangladesh‘s sanitation and healthcare infrastructures—as well as 
the sheer density of the population9—unsafe surface water 
conditions are not dealt with prior to public consumption, 
resulting in widespread illness and death.  In the 1970s, nearly 
250,000 children in Bangladesh died each year from waterborne 
diseases.10 
Another major obstacle to delivering clean surface water is its 
inconsistent availability.  There is a tremendous disparity between 
the amount of water available during the monsoon season and the 
dry season.11  The water diversion practices of Bangladesh‘s upper 
riparian neighbor, India, are a partial cause; by controlling the flow 
of the Ganges at the Farakka Barrage, India allows—some claim—
too much water to flow into Bangladesh during the monsoon 
season and too little during the dry season.12  These practices 
 
of the Ganges river basin in the context of India and stating ―[a]bout 350 million 
people—almost one-third of [India‘s] population—live in the Ganges River basin.  
Very little of the sewage produced by these people and by the industries of 29 
large cities in the basin is treated‖). 
7 ANDREW A. MEHARG, VENOMOUS EARTH: HOW ARSENIC CAUSED THE WORLD‘S 
WORST MASS POISONING 5 (2005). 
8 Id. at 6. 
9 See Khan, supra note 3, at 458 (―The population pressure in Bangladesh is 
greater and the occupation of the flood plains more intense than in India and 
Nepal in the Ganges basin.  Thus, flood damage and distress is significantly 
higher in Bangladesh . . .‖). 
10 Statement on TVNZ Sunday Programme, UNICEF N.Z. (Aug. 9, 2010), 
http://www.unicef.org.nz/article/1528/StatementonTVNZSundayprogramme 
.html; Andrew Buncombe, How the West Poisoned Bangladesh, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 
21, 2010), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/how-the-west-
poisoned-bangladesh-1924631.html. 
11 Because of the flow disparity between the floods in the monsoon season 
and the drought during the dry season, Bangladesh‘s manageable surface water 
resources are thought to be 80% of the dependable flow in March during the pre-
monsoon season.  FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 2, at 49; 
see also Bangladesh, AQUASTAT, http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries 
/bangladesh/index.stm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (providing additional statistics 
about the impact seasonal change has on surface water resources in Bangladesh). 
12 See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 2, at 49 (noting 
that the ‖dam was a source of tension between the two countries, with 
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adversely affect Bangladesh‘s attempts at effective water 
management. The practices do not simply deprive Bangladesh of 
surface water for agriculture; they also have significant ecological, 
economic, and health effects.13 
The region‘s groundwater resources, unfortunately, provide 
little respite.  The Bangladesh government, with the help of 
international organizations, attempted to alleviate water provision 
problems by introducing a solution which utilized its plentiful 
groundwater resources.  In the early 1970s, the United Nations 
Children‘s Fund (―UNICEF‖) encouraged the Bangladesh 
government and NGOs to install approximately 900,000 
groundwater-extracting devices called tube-wells throughout 
Bangladesh.14  Initially this program appeared successful:  illness 
due to waterborne diseases dropped drastically and the infant 
mortality rate was halved from 1990 to 1996.15  The Bangladeshi 
people traded their dependence on water from upstream rivers 
and ponds to dependence, instead, on groundwater.  Currently it is 
estimated that there are more than 10 million tube-wells in rural 
Bangladesh—one tube-well per 11 people.16 
Unfortunately, it was discovered—first in 1978,17 then 
confirmed by scientists in 1983,18 and then brought to world 
attention in 1993 by the Bangladesh Department of Public Health 
and Engineering in Dhaka19—that groundwater from these tube-
wells was tainted with geogenic (naturally occurring) arsenic.20  
 
Bangladesh asserting that the dam held back too much water during the dry 
season and released too much water during monsoon rains‖). 
13 See generally Nahid Islam, Indo-Bangladesh Common Rivers: The Impact on 
Bangladesh, 1 CONTEMP. S. ASIA 203 (1992) (discussing, inter alia, the extensive 
effects of India‘s Farakka Barrage project on the environment and economy of 
Bangladesh). 
14 Statement on TVNZ Sunday Programme, supra note 10. 
15 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 7. 
16 Statement on TVNZ Sunday Programme, supra note 10. 
17 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 7. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 14. 
20 A lawsuit by a Bangladeshi man was filed in British High Court accusing 
the British Geological Survey (―BGS‖) of gross negligence when it conducted 
research for the UN tube-well drilling operation and failed to discover the arsenic 
contamination.  Alastair Lawson, Bangladesh Arsenic Case Begins, BBC NEWS, Mar. 
25, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2886079.stm (reporting on the 
commencement of legal proceedings).  The court ultimately found in favor of 
BGS.  Bangladesh Man Loses Arsenic Case, BBC NEWS, July 5, 2006, http://news 
.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5150210.stm.  This outcome was likely positive for 
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This longstanding issue has drawn gradually increasing attention 
in the world arena.21  
By drinking the groundwater—and by cooking and growing 
crops with it—Bangladesh suffers a slow, Napoleonic demise.  
Long-term exposure to arsenic ―causes cancer of the skin, lungs, 
urinary bladder, and kidney, as well as other skin changes such as 
pigmentation changes and thickening (hyperkeratosis).‖22  It is 
estimated that between 4623 and 7024 million people are currently 
drinking water that contains more than 10 micrograms per liter of 
arsenic, which is the provisional World Health Organization 
(―WHO‖) guideline value of acceptable arsenic consumption.25  
Further, it is estimated that between 35 and 77 ―million people in 
 
Bangladesh; holding entities like the BGS liable for negligence in this type of 
situation probably serves as a disincentive for international organizations 
considering investment in Bangladesh water management. 
21 Bangladesh Government and UN officials published a report on March 22, 
2010 calling for ―urgent action to tackle what remains a huge problem of 
contamination, both from drinking water and from crops such as rice that are 
irrigated with contaminated water.‖  Buncombe, supra note 10.  Prior to this, the 
crisis had not been ignored, per se, but had received, at best, scattered (though 
impassioned) coverage.  See, e.g., Arsenic-Polluted Well Water Threatens Bangladesh 
Villagers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1997, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com 
/1997/08/07/world/arsenic-polluted-well-water-threatens-bangladesh-villagers 
.html (revealing the havoc wreaked on individual families by the wells containing 
arsenic-contaminated water); Barry Bearak, Bangladeshis Sipping Arsenic as Plan for 
Safe Water Stalls, N. Y. TIMES, July 14, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com 
/2002/07/14/world/bangladeshis-sipping-arsenic-as-plan-for-safe-water-stalls 
.html (describing the lethal, unintended consequences of the tube-well plan); 
Barry Bearak, Death by Arsenic: A Special Report; New Bangladesh Disaster: Wells that 
Pump Poison, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1998, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes 
.com/1998/11/10/world/death-by-arsenic-a-special-report-new-bangladesh-
disaster-wells-that-pump-poison.html (reporting on the horrors caused by the 
poisonous wells); John Vidal, Deadly Waters, GUARDIAN, May 8, 2003, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2003/may/08/science.highereducation 
(detailing the circumstances surrounding the mass arsenic poisoning); David 
Rohde & Julfikar Ali Manik, The Lethal Water Wells of Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES, July 
17, 2005, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C04EFD9103CF934 
A25754C0A9639C8B63 (highlighting the perniciousness of the contaminated 
wells). 
22 Arsenic in Drinking Water, Fact Sheet N°210, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (last 
revised May 2001), available at http://www.knowledgebank.irri.org 
/factsheetsPDFs/Health_and_Nutrition/whoFS_arsenic.pdf. 
23 Seth H. Frisbie et al., The Concentrations of Arsenic and Other Toxic Elements 
in Bangladesh’s Drinking Water, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1147, 1152 (2002). 
24 An Interview with Mahmuder Rahman: Bangladesh’s Arsenic Agony, 86 BULL. 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 11, 11 (2008) [hereinafter Rahman Interview]. 
25 Arsenic in Drinking Water, Fact Sheet No 210, supra note 22. 
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Bangladesh have been chronically exposed to increased 
concentrations of arsenic through drinking water‖ since the 
1970s,26 and that approximately 21% of the ―all-cause‖ deaths in 
Bangladesh are associated with arsenic contamination.27 
Thus, Bangladesh is faced with a tremendous dilemma in its 
attempts to provide water to its population.  It must decide upon 
some combination of relying on surface water and relying on 
groundwater.  Neither type can be comfortably relied upon.  
Reliance on surface water is hampered by biohazards and 
pollutants deposited locally and upstream.  It is also restricted by 
weeks of little to no water during drought seasons.  Reliance on 
groundwater, meanwhile, has lethal implications due to arsenic. 
This Article will not argue that either option is wholly better 
than the other.  Nor will it attempt to decide what precise 
proportion of surface water and groundwater is ideal.28  Instead, it 
will examine why Bangladesh cannot merely rely upon 
groundwater, and then consider the feasibility of ensuring a 
constant quantity of surface water for Bangladesh by utilizing 
international law. 
Future attempts at ensuring sufficient and sanitary water 
delivery will fail unless—in conjunction with the policy articulated 
in Bangladesh‘s 2004 National Policy for Arsenic Mitigation 
(specifically, a ―preference to surface water over groundwater as 
source for water supply‖29)—Bangladesh leverages international 
law to limit the damming practices of its upper riparian neighbors 
and actively pursues an internal water augmentation plan to 
ensure a constant availability of surface water.  This will ease the 
pressure on the dual goals of purifying arsenic-tainted 
groundwater and weaning the population off of groundwater in 
cases where a long-term purification solution cannot be 
implemented. 
In Part 2, this Article will (1) examine the government‘s 
attempts at arsenic mitigation and (2) note potential shortcomings 
 
26 Maria Argos et al., Arsenic Exposure from Drinking Water, and All-Cause and 
Chronic-Disease Mortalities in Bangladesh (HEALS): A Prospective Cohort Study, 376 
LANCET 252, 252 (2010) (emphasis added). 
27 Id. at 255. 
28 In 1999, UNICEF published a report very reasonably stating that ―‗[a] 
balanced package of interventions, that uses safe surface, ground and rain water 
sources as dictated by the local situation will ultimately be the most appropriate 
solution.‘‖  MEHARG, supra note 7, at 178 (quoting the 1999 UNICEF report). 
29 National Policy for Arsenic Mitigation, §5.2.2 (2004) (Bangl.). 
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in these efforts.  This Article will establish that relying on the 
current methods to mitigate the arsenic problem—i.e. finding safe, 
often groundwater-based alternative water sources or espousing 
arsenic purification processes—are insufficient because they fail to 
address the looming issue of increasingly contaminated soil.  Part 2 
will discuss difficulties in improving water quality and argue that 
Bangladesh will need to take more active steps if it truly intends to 
reestablish the population‘s reliance on surface water. 
Part 3 will explore the difficulties of transitioning back to 
surface water from the perspective of quantity.  It will (1) highlight 
the difficulties of negotiating for more water from its upper 
riparian neighbors by reviewing how the 1996 Treaty on Sharing of 
the Ganges Waters at Farakka30 (―Treaty‖ or ―Ganges Treaty‖)—
the region‘s sole river treaty—was secured and (2) identify the 
dangers of upper riparian plans such as the upcoming India Inter-
Basin Water Transfer (―IBWT‖) Project, which will increase the 
burden on the already strained surface water resources in 
Bangladesh. 
Section 4 will attempt to outline the ways in which Bangladesh 
might secure a larger and more constant flow of water.  It will (1) 
examine the upper riparian obligations of India that arise from the 
Ganges Treaty, which limits India‘s ability to divert more water 
from the Ganges, (2) explore the ways broader international law 
concepts might help Bangladesh in its attempts to prevent more 
surface water loss, and (3) argue in favor of surface water 
augmentation projects like the stalled Ganga Barrage. 
2. SHORTCOMINGS IN CURRENT ARSENIC MITIGATION EFFORTS 
The response to the arsenic crisis by the national government 
and international aid organizations has been called, by one 
observer, ―in the main, ineffective.‖31  It is difficult to argue 
otherwise, given the number of Bangladeshis still drinking, 
cooking with, and farming with arsenic-tainted water.  This section 
will first attempt to identify high-level reasons for this lack of 
progress; then it will catalogue the Bangladesh government‘s 
response to the crisis. 
 
30 See generally Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of India and 
the Government of the People‘s Republic of Bangladesh on Sharing of the 
Ganga/Ganges Waters at Farakka, Bangl.-India, Dec. 12, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 519 (1997) 
[hereinafter 1996 Ganges Treaty]. 
31 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 21. 
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2.1. High-Level Reasons for Lack of Progress 
Despite significant investment from outside entities, large-scale 
projects in Bangladesh seem to stagnate.  Andrew Meharg points to 
spending patterns in borrowed money from the World Bank as an 
indicator of this phenomenon.32  In particular, he points to a $34 
million interest-free loan that was granted in 1998 to fight the 
arsenic crisis.33  This was the Bangladesh Arsenic Mitigation Water 
Supply Project (―BAMWSP‖),34 a $44 million project35 whose 
development objective was to ―reduce mortality and morbidity in 
rural and urban populations caused by arsenic contamination of 
groundwater using sustainable water supply, health, and water 
management strategies.‖36  By 2000, only $2 million were spent, all 
on committees and consultants; by 2004, only $6 million were 
spent.37  While the failure to spend is hardly a definitive indicator 
of project failure (given that this does not take into account the 
actual accomplishment of the project‘s goals), evidently some aspect 
of this massive project malfunctioned. 
The World Bank‘s own evaluation of this project also indicates 
a less than stellar performance, though it is not as grim in its 
 
32 See id. (describing a representative stalled aid program in Bangladesh and 
its related spending). 
33 Id. 
34 See generally RURAL DEV. SECTOR UNIT, WORLD BANK, S. ASIA REGION, 
PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT FOR A PROPOSED CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 24.2 
MILLION EQUIVALENT TO THE PEOPLE‘S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH FOR A ARSENIC 
MITIGATION WATER SUPPLY PROJECT, Report No. 18252–BD (1998) (providing a 
detailed overview of the BAMWSP project, including a brief description of key 
interventions that the project will support, such as on-site mitigation, improved 
understanding of the arsenic problem, and strengthening of implementation 
capacity). 
35 This figure includes contributions from sources beyond the World Bank 
coffers, including the Bangladesh Government and foreign financers.  Id. at 3. 
36 ENV‘T & WATER RES. UNIT, WORLD BANK, S. ASIA REGION, IMPLEMENTATION 
COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 24.2 MILLION 
(US$ 44.4 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO BANGLADESH FOR ARSENIC MITIGATION WATER 
SUPPLY, Report No. ICR000028, at iii (2007) [hereinafter BAMWSP RESULTS].  The 
project, among other things, was responsible for painting shallow tube-wells red, 
testing groundwater for arsenic for inclusion in a national database, and installing 
a variety of alternative water sources for villagers: 9,272 deep tube-wells, 300 
rainwater harvesting systems, 393 dug wells, and 1 piped water supply system.  
Id. at iii–v. 
37 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 21. 
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evaluation.  BAMWSP was deemed ―moderately satisfactory‖ in a 
2007 evaluation,38 despite negative initial evaluations.39   
This positive grade might be appropriate; the project did 
experience a burst of successful spending activity in its later 
years.40  However, critics might note that the project‘s ―success‖ 
included a considerable reframing of its objectives, which involved 
a removal of health activities to another World Bank project which 
never came to fruition, four extensions of the grant closing date, 
and two grant cancellations (due to slow performance and un-
utilized credit, respectively).41  In short, the ―moderately‖ good 
grade seems predicated on changing the curve.   
Other World Bank projects devoted to helping Bangladesh with 
water management have had even less luck than BAMWSP.  One 
example is the 1996 Fourth Dhaka Water Supply Project 
(―FDWSP‖),42 which was deemed ―unsatisfactory‖ upon review43 
and prematurely cancelled after $50.6 million of an $80.3 million 
grant had already been spent.44  Another example is the 
Bangladesh Water Supply Program Project (―BWSPP‖), the 2004 
follow-up project to BAMWSP, which involved a $40 million dollar 
grant.45  BWSPP, much like BAMWSP, stagnated in its early stages, 
 
38 BAMWSP RESULTS, supra note 36, at i. 
39 Id. at 8 (―Over a 2½-year period (December 1999 to December 2000; June 
2002 to December 2003), the project was rated ‗unsatisfactory‘ for 
implementation.‖).   
40 Id. at vi. 
41 Id. at 3–4. 
42 WORLD BANK, S. ASIA REGION, IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT ON A 
CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDRS 51.0 MILLION (US $80.3 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO 
THE PEOPLE‘S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH FOR A FOURTH DHAKA WATER SUPPLY 
PROJECT, Report No. 25247, at 1 (2002) [hereinafter FDWSP IMPLEMENTATION] 
(describing project results and data from the Fourth Dhaka Water Supply Project). 
43 The $175.8 million project was intended, among other things, ―to start 
institutional reforms to enhance the efficiency of the water and sanitation sector in 
Dhaka by putting it on a commercial basis, and preparing a strategy for greater 
private sector participation.‖  Id. at 5.  This objective was not met, ―even though 
the project‘s major physical works were completed satisfactorily, below budget 
and ahead of time, and a number of positive aspects concerning DWASA‘s 
institutional development were achieved.‖  Id. 
44 Id. at 28–29. 
45 WORLD BANK, BANGLADESH WATER SUPPLY PROGRAM PROJECT PROPOSAL TO 
RESTRUCTURE, No. 45616, at 1 (2008) [hereinafter BWSPP RESTRUCTURE]. 
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with only $1 million of the credit disbursed during its first three 
years.46 
Examining these projects suggests that at least part of the 
problem arises from within the Bangladesh government itself.47  A 
cynical explanation is that government officials in Bangladesh are 
corrupt, ineffective, or uncaring.48  Alternatively, one may posit 
that the politicians have their hands tied as a result of political 
instability and rapid party-control turnover.  Any attempt to 
counter this effect—via, for example, government measures that 
preserve project-related job security and provide funding resistant 
to political turmoil or via a results-based reward/job-security 
system that forces individual interests to coincide with project 
interests by disincentivizing funding misallocations, corruption, or 
blithe ineffectiveness—might be predicated on an unrealistic hope 
for non-partisan entities being effective in a highly partisan 
political climate. 
Meharg also points to overwhelming health issues on the 
government‘s plate, such as AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, diarrhea, 
and malnutrition, as a reason for the ineffectiveness of large-scale 
efforts; as he puts it, ―arsenic is just another entry on a long list of 
killers.‖49  The intrinsically challenging situation is further 
complicated by the Bangladesh government‘s need to rely on 
external aid to resolve any public health problems.50  When one 
 
46 BAMWSP RESULTS, supra note 36, at 8 (―[BWSPP] is in the same position in 
which BAMWSP was in its early years, with extremely slow progress made thus 
far, and only US$1 million of the credit disbursed after nearly three years.‖).  In 
2007, the project was ultimately swept away as a priority by two devastating 
floods and Cyclone ―SIDR.‖  BWSPP RESTRUCTURE, supra note 45, at 2.  It has since 
been significantly restructured to include funding reallocation for building water 
supplies for flood and cyclone victims and less ambitious goals in the area of rural 
piped water supply and municipal water supply.  See id at 4–7 (describing 
changes in scope and ambition for the project components). 
47 FDWSP IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 42, at 6 (―[M]aybe because the 
program of change was never fully owned by the Bangladeshi agencies 
concerned, watered-down compromises were often the best that could be 
achieved during implementation.‖). 
48 See Asadullah Khan, The Looming Water Crisis, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), May 16, 
2009, http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=88351 
(―The past governments were largely to blame for their failure to assess the 
gravity of the situation and curb siphoning of groundwater. And the present Al-
led government that came to power with some firm pledges must not indulge in 
lip-service but get into action.‖). 
49 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 19. 
50 See Allan H. Smith et al., Contamination of Drinking-Water by Arsenic in 
Bangladesh: A Public Health Emergency, 78 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 1093, 1096–97 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss3/3
SARWAR.DOC 3/18/2011  9:26 PM 
2011] ARSENIC MITIGATION IN BANGLADESH 853 
combines these factors with logistical concerns not unique to 
Bangladesh (such as underdeveloped communication and 
transportation systems), it is perhaps not surprising that the 
government and established, oft-effective organizations such as the 
WHO find it difficult to educate the community,51 enact 
intervention programs,52 or act ―at all levels.‖53  This is unfortunate 
given that, ―in contrast to diseases like malaria, cholera and 
tuberculosis, which require a more complex public health 
response, the response to arsenic contamination is clear-cut:  
provide arsenic-free water.‖54 
Mahmuder Rahman, a physician and expert on the arsenic 
crisis, who has spent considerable time helping the Bangladesh 
government tackle the problem,55 points in frustration to the more 
general explanation of systemic misdirection in mitigation attempts.  
Too much effort, he notes, is being put into developing short-term 
alternative safe water sources.56  Additionally, solutions are being 
implemented without a proper understanding of Bangladesh‘s 
―geography, culture, and pattern of water use.‖57  He points to a 
failure to consider the total water resources of the country—among 
them, surface water: 
Most of these experts come with the preconceived idea that 
dug wells and surface water are totally polluted with 
bacteria, but they forget that with simple and affordable 
technology these water supplies can be made safe and can 
play a major part in mitigation of this major problem.58 
 
(2000) (summarizing the panoply of challenges organizations in Bangladesh face 
in dealing with health crises and discussing short term strategies to address 
arsenic poisoning). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 See Arsenic in Drinking Water, Fact Sheet No 210, supra note 22 (―The poor 
availability of reliable information hinders action at all levels and may lead to 
panic, exacerbated if misleading reports are made.  Effective information channels 
have yet to be established to those affected and concerned.‖) 
54 Smith et al., supra note 50, at 1097. 
55 Rahman took a leading role in the formulation of Bangladesh‘s National 
Arsenic Mitigation Policy.  Rahman Interview, supra note 24, at 11. 
56 Id. at 11–12. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
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Given the immense number of contributing reasons, it is easy to 
come up with explanations of why efforts have been mired in 
setbacks.  Unfortunately, good data on which contributing reasons 
have the most ―miring‖ effects are sparse or non-existent.  Thus, 
the question of how to speed up efforts is more difficult. 
2.2. Issues with the Government Response 
The Bangladesh government has generated internal policies 
attempting to consolidate and streamline the arsenic mitigation 
process.  Given the stagnation established in the previous section, 
it is unclear whether these policies are working.  This section will 
explore the ways in which Bangladesh‘s policies might be ill-
designed for the task of arsenic mitigation.   
2.2.1. An Outdated Standard for Arsenic Contamination 
First, many of the policies enacted in Bangladesh operate on the 
assumption that arsenic contamination should be prevented when 
it is above the Bangladesh National Standard59 of 50 parts per 
billion (―ppb‖).60  This standard is mentioned in the 2004 National 
Policy for Arsenic Mitigation61 and the 2004 Implementation Plan 
for Arsenic Mitigation in Bangladesh (―IPAMB‖).62 
This is an obsolete standard.  The International Standards for 
Drinking-Water originally established 0.20 mg/L as an allowable 
concentration for arsenic in 1958.63  In 1963, the standard was re-
evaluated and reduced to 0.05 mg/L.64  In 1984, this was used as 
WHO‘s ―Guideline Value,‖ spurring many countries to use this as 
a national standard or as an interim target.65  Meharg suggests that 
the revised 0.05 mg/L standard arose from an early 1900s 
European measurement for survivable quantity of acute exposure 
to arsenic, not chronic.66  
 
59 Environment Conservation Rules 1997, sched. 3 (Bangl.) (setting the 
national arsenic standard at .05 mg/L); see also Environment Conservation Act 
1995 (Bangl.). 
60 National Policy for Arsenic Mitigation § 1.1 (2004) (Bangl.). 
61 Id. 
62 Implementation Plan for Arsenic Mitigation in Bangladesh § 1 (2004). 
63 Arsenic in Drinking Water, Fact Sheet No 210, supra note 22. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 11. 
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The last edition of the WHO Guidelines for Drinking-Water 
Quality—established in 1993—changed the concentration to 0.01 
mg/L or 10 ppb.67  
The Bangladesh government designs its processes for an 
estimated 30 million people who are drinking water that contains 
more than 50 mg/L arsenic.68  As noted before, up to 70 million 
people—an additional 40 million, over double the government‘s 
target—are drinking water that contains more than the WHO 
guideline.69 
In order to properly address its arsenic crisis, Bangladesh 
should update its standard.  It is currently directing the entirety of 
its arsenic mitigation projects to a fraction of those who are in 
danger of suffering from chronic arsenic poisoning.   
2.2.2. Plans, Policies, and Other Unenforced Suggestions 
Another potentially crippling characteristic of Bangladesh‘s 
water management policies is that they are nonbinding and, from a 
practical perspective, judicially unenforceable.  The documents 
which direct Bangladesh‘s arsenic mitigation efforts—National 
Water Policy of 1999,70 National Water Management Plan of 2001,71 
National Policy for Arsenic Mitigation of 2004, and the IPAMB72—
are essentially guidelines.  To date, there is no enforceable statute 
that imposes any consequences upon local governments—or other 
entities implementing arsenic mitigation technologies—for failing 
to follow them.73  The policies primarily prescribe the formation of 
 
67 Arsenic in Drinking Water, Fact Sheet No 210, supra note 22. 
68 Rahman Interview, supra note 24, at 11. 
69 Id. 
70 Bangladesh‘s National Water Policy aims at providing direction to all 
agencies working with the water sector and sets for them objectives.  It is not an 
Act and has no attached or specified form of enforcement.  See generally National 
Water Policy (1999) (Bangl.). 
71 The National Water Management Plan is a framework plan with the 
objective of ―rationalising and decentralising management of the sector.‖  1 
National Water Management Plan, at i (2001) (Bangl.).  Line agencies and other 
organizations are expected to plan and implement their own activities in a 
coordinated manner ―in line with‖ the plan.  Id. at iii. 
72 This document arises directly from the National Policy for Arsenic 
Mitigation.  ―An implementation plan shall be prepared which will provide the 
operational framework for arsenic mitigation activities in the country.‖  National 
Policy for Arsenic Mitigation § 10.2 (2004) (Bangl.). 
73 ASIAN DEV. BANK & WATER RES. PLANNING ORG. (Bangl.), VOLUME 1: FINAL 
REPORT AND ROADMAP, ADB RETA PROJECT NO. 39199: PROCESS DEVELOPMENT FOR 
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committees,74 ―suitable‖ regulatory schemes,75 or ―appropriate‖ 
regulatory measures.76  Occasionally, some provisions of these 
documents are worded strongly and imply actual consequences in 
the event of violation:  Section 3.2.5 of the IPAMB, for example, 
prohibits the installation of unapproved arsenic purification 
technologies without first getting clearance from a government 
committee responsible for ensuring their safety.77  The plan states: 
[A]ll agencies/companies/manufacturers must be made 
liable for any kind of failure of the unit, adverse affect to 
any user and environmental damages caused by the 
technology used.  An agreement ensuring consumer 
protection and legal liability of the proponent should be 
made between the proponent and the validating agency.78 
Note, however, that despite its seeming strength, the language 
does not indicate that private entities will actually be held liable—
because the plan is not a binding law it appropriately pushes the 
private entity to include in its contract a provision which 
subsequently may be taken to Bangladeshi courts for enforcement.  
Again, the lack of such a contract provision would technically not 
be legally problematic for an agency, company, or manufacturer. 
 
PREPARING AND IMPLEMENTING INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PLANS 
18, para. 64 (2009) [hereinafter ADB REPORT] (noting that while these policies 
―appear to promote participatory and sustainable development of the water 
sector‖ they ―are not judicially enforceable . . . although they may guide and 
influence concerned ministries and agencies‖). 
74 National Policy for Arsenic Mitigation § 6.1 (2004) (Bangl.) (―The 
Government shall form a high level committee or designate any such existing 
committee to oversee all activities, implementation programmes in accordance 
with this policy.‖).   
75 Id. § 6.6 (―Groundwater being a natural resource, a suitable regulatory 
mechanism shall be in place to regulate all activities in relation to groundwater 
such as exploration, exploitation and management.‖). 
76 The government ―[s]hall formulate appropriate regulatory measures to 
ensure that all research on arsenic in the country whether by local or expatriate 
organisations or individual researchers are undertaken in a co-ordinated way and 
the results are shared with the government of Bangladesh or its designated 
agency . . .‖  Id. § 7.2. 
77 See Implementation Plan for Arsenic Mitigation in Bangladesh § 3.2.5 
(2004) (―While the marketing of the removal options should be through the 
private sector the government shall . . . not allow marketing of any such 
technology without proper testing and validation from Bangladesh Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research(BCSIR) [sic].‖). 
78 Id. 
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The issue is straightforward:  because courts cannot and do not 
mandate adherence to these national policies, it is unclear to what 
extent local statutes or committees—formed from these policies—
can exercise power over water management activities. 
This ―toothlessness‖ on the national legal level does not, of 
course, wholly deprive the policies of value.  For one thing, their 
advisory flavor is part of their design79—the Bangladesh 
government perhaps realized that a centralized statute for water 
management would be logistically nightmarish, given the plethora 
and variance of water sanitation problems across regions of 
Bangladesh.80 
Further, their existence is a significant boon to mitigation 
efforts due to their relatively advanced level of detail.  The 
implementation plans, in particular, seem designed to be 
operations manuals, bulked up with technological annexes81 and 
similar components aimed at being practically useful to local 
government officials. 
Additionally, there is evidence that individual sections of these 
plans and policies play a role in directing the activities of the 
Bangladesh government and NGOs.  Note, again, section 5.2.2 of 
the National Policy for Arsenic Mitigation, which directs 
organizations to ―[g]ive preference to surface water over 
groundwater as source for water supply‖82—in accordance to this 
provision, the World Bank limited the number of deep tube-wells it 
installed for BAMWSP.83  The suggestions are being adhered to on 
some level. 
 
79 1 National Water Management Plan, at i (2001) (Bangl.) (stating that ‖the 
Plan is a framework plan within which line agencies and other organisations are 
expected to plan and implement their own activities in a coordinated manner‖). 
80 This is reflected in the National Policy for Arsenic Mitigation which calls 
for a ―[m]ove towards decentralised planning and delivery of safe water options 
and health services through the grass root level local government institutions . . . 
.‖  National Policy for Arsenic Mitigation § 6.4 (2004) (Bangl.). 
81 See, e.g., Implementation Plan for Arsenic Mitigation in Bangladesh, Annex 
A, Annex B, Annex C (2004) (providing, lists of arsenic-prone upazilas,and guides 
for dug well and pond sand filter construction). 
82 National Policy for Arsenic Mitigation § 5.2.2 (2004) (Bangl.). 
83 See BAMWSP RESULTS, supra note 36, at 3–4 (―As surface water was 
recommended as the sole arsenic-safe source in the National Arsenic Mitigation 
Policy, implementation of the deep tubewell option was permitted, as an 
exception, only in coastal areas . . .‖). 
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But perhaps not enough.  As one observer has noted, ―water 
use laws of South Asia are rarely followed or enforced.‖84  There 
has been some movement towards the passage of an enforceable 
Water Act,85 one that would translate the National Water Policy 
into law and ―thereby ensure integrated management, 
development, and equitable utilization of the countries [sic] water 
resources.‖86  Such an Act was slated for completion in 201087 (and 
as yet, is not law).  In the pipeline as well is a National Water Code 
whose purpose is to ―assemble all of the various pieces of 
legislation to ensure consistency and synergy in application.‖88  It 
is unclear, however, whether either of these will be passed or will 
be effective when passed. 
2.2.3. Lack of a Unified Groundwater Act 
Bangladesh lacks a Groundwater Act.  Because groundwater is 
used extensively for both consumption and agriculture—despite 
being poisoned—some type of regulation is needed, given how 
much is used and how much poison is contained therein. 
As noted before, it is estimated that the country operates more 
than 10 million tube-wells.89  This is a drastic increase from the 
1960s, when Bangladesh used almost no groundwater.90  The 
percent of land irrigated by groundwater (total irrigated land) rose 
from 4% in 1972 to 70% in 1999.91  By 2010, Bangladesh was 
 
84 John C. Peck & Burke W. Griggs, Groundwater Law and Management: The 
Asia (IWMI)-Kansas Program, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 315, 348 (2008). 
85 See generally Draft Bangladesh Water Act, 2008, available at 
http://www.warpo.gov.bd/RETA/Draft%20BWA.pdf; Draft Bangladesh Water 
Act, 2010, available at http://www.warpo.gov.bd/PDFs/Draft_BWA.pdf. 
86 Summary of Regional Technical Assistance (RETA) Supporting IWRM 
(Bangladesh), WATER RESOURCES PLANNING ORGANIZATION, http://www.warpo 
.gov.bd/RETA/Reta.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) [hereinafter WARPO 
REGIONAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WEBSITE].  WARPO is a Government agency 
under the Ministry of Water Resources that forms an apex body in the water 
sector that acts as a macro-level planning organization for integrated water 
resources management.  WATER RESOURCES PLANNING ORGANIZATION, http:// 
www.warpo.gov.bd/index.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
87 WARPO REGIONAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WEBSITE, supra note 86. 
88 Id. 
89 See Statement on TVNZ Sunday Programme, supra note 10. 
90 See Tushaar Shah, The Groundwater Economy of South Asia: An Assessment of 
Size, Significance, and Socio-Ecological Impacts, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 407, 408 
(2006). 
91 Id. 
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expected to have withdrawn 70–75 cubic kilometers of 
groundwater annually.92  Up to 94% of these tube-wells are 
privately owned and sunk without regulation or monitoring.93   
Observers have called for a Groundwater Act that would 
control exploration, development, and management of 
groundwater utilization.94  Such an Act should, at minimum, limit 
tube-well drilling—a priority, given the present overabundance of 
unmonitored groundwater use noted above.  Observers have noted 
that an ideal Groundwater Act would also take into account 
conservation considerations, ensuring adequate replenishment of 
underground aquifers and thus protecting wetlands, forests, and 
open fields.95  This is not off of the Bangladesh government‘s 
radar—a Groundwater Act was contemplated by the National 
Policy for Arsenic Mitigation96 and the IPAMB.97  Terms regulating 
groundwater were also articulated in the Bangladesh Draft Water 
Act of 2008.98   
Unfortunately, the lack of a Groundwater Act has led to grim 
groundwater conditions that exacerbate the arsenic problem in 
Bangladesh.99  Unfettered and unregulated tube-well placement 
has led to water losses in channels and fields, inadequate drainage, 
insufficient conjunctive use of tube-wells, and extensive pollution 
(from agriculture and industry); these have led, in turn, to a 
permanent depletion of static groundwater levels (as much as three 
feet per year in Dhaka), rampant waterlogging, resource 
salinization, a sinking water table, skyrocketing pumping and 
irrigation costs, and, in urban areas, severe land subsidence.100 
 
92 See id. at 415 fig.6. 
93 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 7. 
94 See AFIFA RAIHANA & DR. A Z M IFTIKHAR HUSSAIN, SILENT KILLER IN ACTION 
110 (2004) (listing management recommendations for groundwater usage). 
95 Id. 
96 See National Policy for Arsenic Mitigation § 6.6 (2004) (Bangl.) (stating that 
a ―regulatory mechanism‖ would be implemented in order to oversee 
groundwater utilization). 
97 See Implementation Plan for Arsenic Mitigation in Bangladesh § 6.2 (2004) 
(stating that a Groundwater Act should be enacted to regulate all groundwater 
related activities). 
98 Draft Bangladesh Water Act, 2008, ch. VI, § 47, available at 
http://www.warpo.gov.bd/RETA/Draft%20BWA.pdf (setting forth conditions 
for the control and protection of groundwater). 
99 See Peck & Griggs, supra note 84, at 337 (citing the overexploitation of 
groundwater as a reason for high levels of arsenic contamination in Bangladesh). 
100 Id. at 331. 
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Troublingly, the solutes finding their way into humans from 
groundwater are not restricted to arsenic:  aluminum, iron, zinc, 
and copper are also present in Bangladeshi groundwater.101  One 
study has estimated that tens of millions of Bangladeshis are 
drinking water with unsafe levels of manganese, boron, barium, 
chromium, molybdenum, nickel, lead, or uranium.102  In Dhaka, 
―[g]eogenic mineralization, combined with groundwater depletion 
and industrial pollution‖ has created ―alarmingly‖ high 
concentrations of chromium, aluminum, and iron in drinking 
water.103  Given that it is unclear what these poisons will do at 
these quantities over time,104 a Groundwater Act seems extremely 
important for slowing the systematic and myriad poisoning of the 
Bangladeshi population. 
John Peck and Burke Griggs note that India‘s lack of support of 
a Groundwater Act stems in part from the complexity of 
―enforc[ing] a centralized regulatory regime on millions of private 
well owners.‖105  The case is precisely the same with Bangladesh.  It 
might be wise, thus, to look to India‘s example106 for some 
guidance on how to structure internal policies regarding 
groundwater management.107  However, the challenges India faces 
 
101 See id. at 337 (listing solutes found in the groundwater of Bangladesh). 
102 Frisbie et al., supra note 23, at 1152. 
103 Peck & Griggs, supra note 84, at 337. 
104 When arguing against dependence on groundwater, Rahman notes: ―We 
do not want to risk bringing up other toxic material of which we have very little 
knowledge, such as boron.  It‘s only arsenic today, but we do not know what will 
come next.‖  Rahman Interview, supra note 24, at 11. 
105 Peck & Griggs, supra note 84, at 349. 
106 India has a Central Ground Water Authority that monitors groundwater 
contamination, regulates agencies involved in the construction of wells, reviews 
and authorizes groundwater projects, and promotes conservation measures such 
as rainwater harvesting.  Officials are preparing a zoning atlas for the appropriate 
use of water depending upon region, a plan by which states will regulate the 
private market in water, and a plan to use satellite imagery to map groundwater.  
Peck & Griggs, supra note 84, at 349–50. 
107 Bangladesh, in conjunction with the Government of Denmark, is currently 
engaged in various ―sub-projects‖ through its Policy Support Unit.  One such 
project is a groundwater map project, which is in its infancy stages.  See generally 
PROJECT SUPPORT UNIT, BANGL. MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOV‘T, RURAL DEV. & COOP., 
CONCEPT NOTE ON NATIONAL GROUNDWATER DATABASE FOR WATER SUPPLY AND 
SANITATION IN BANGLADESH 2 (2009), available at http://www.psu-wss.org/images 
/pdf/psuSubProject/GroundWaterMapping/Concept%20Paper_PSU_GWM.pdf.  
Note how this is differently structured (necessarily) from projects we might see in 
India as this project incorporates significant resources and financial aid of an 
additional nation, a measure India does not necessarily need to take. 
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in the implementation of its water management plans are in some 
ways different from those faced by Bangladesh.  India, for 
example, does not have to deal with the unilateral water diversion 
actions of a militarily and economically mighty upper riparian 
neighbor. 
2.2.4. Complications in Implementing Alternative Water Sources 
Successfully implementing alternative water sources in 
Bangladesh has proven difficult.  The first major problem is that 
Bangladeshis still use shallow tube-wells despite the steps that the 
Bangladesh government took to wean the population off of 
groundwater.  The second major problem is that there are 
numerous technological and cultural wrinkles in implementing 
alternative water sources that make the entire endeavor, due to the 
lack of a reasonable monitoring system, prone to failure.  
2.2.4.1. Painting Oneself into a Corner 
In response to the arsenic crisis, Bangladesh‘s government 
came up with a straightforward solution to wean people off of 
tube-wells.  In conjunction with the World Bank,108 it tested tube-
wells across the nation and painted them green or red depending 
on whether they were safe (green) or unsafe (red). 
This solution, however, was not effective.  The primary 
problem was that the bad wells were not sealed off; water can still 
be drawn from them.  Rahman explains that after some time, 
because of a lack of clean alternatives, people start to drink and use 
the water again.109  Because arsenic is undetectable and causes no 
immediate symptoms, people—especially children—return to the 
poison.110  Meharg, in response to this issue, advocates destroying 
the wells—―[i]f villagers have to travel distances of hundreds of 
metres or more to obtain ‗green‘ water,‖ he reasons, ―they can be 
tempted to use the red pumps.‖111 
Others have noted that, ―[s]ince most of the tube[-wells] are 
privately owned, people are moving their red tube[-wells] and 
sinking‖ them elsewhere.112  This understandably creates 
 
108 BAMWSP RESULTS, supra note 36, at iii–v. 
109 Rahman Interview, supra note 24, at 11. 
110 Id. 
111 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 176. 
112 RAIHANA & HUSSAIN, supra note 94, at 31–32 (emphasis added). 
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confusion, since some red tube-wells are occasionally safe.113  To 
compound the problem, green tube-wells may exhibit variability in 
their arsenic content—after testing as safe, these tube-wells may 
and have become contaminated with arsenic after operation.114   
Finally, it is noteworthy that individuals living in Bangladesh 
villages may not be familiar with the red/green signal concept; it is 
a foreign, Western notion, one that is sometimes unnoticed in a 
clearing during a long-desired water break.115   
2.2.4.2. Sustainability and Acceptability of Alternative Water 
Sources. 
The main alternative water supplies approved for use by the 
Bangladesh government—and promoted by policymakers as long-
term solutions116—are dug wells, pond sand filters, rainwater 
harvesters, deep tube-wells, and a limited number of piped water 
schemes (using groundwater and sometimes surface water).117 
Each of these technologies has their advantages and 
disadvantages, from the technological perspective or from the 
perspective of ease of integration into Bangladeshi life.  For the 
most part, however, they seem ill-fit to serve as long-term 
solutions. 
The Arsenic Policy Support Unit (―APSU‖) conducted a survey 
of the status of water supplies installed in arsenic-affected 
communities.  In addition to the above technologies, the study took 
into account older installations, such as arsenic-iron removal plants 
or shallow shrouded tube-wells.118  The study looked to see 
whether the solutions were sustainable.  Various alarming findings 
were published. 
The survey found that approximately 8.4% of the installations 
were missing.119  The following reasons for their absence were 
 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 47. 
117 Implementation Plan for Arsenic Mitigation in Bangladesh § 3.2.1–3.2.6 
(2004). 
118 See AHAMMADUL KABIR & GUY HOWARD, ARSENIC POLICY SUPPORT UNIT, 
THE SUSTAINABILITY OF ARSENIC MITIGATION INTERVENTIONS: A SURVEY OF THE 
FUNCTIONAL STATUS OF WATER SUPPLIES 1 (2006) (summarizing the scope of the 
APSU water supply survey). 
119 Id. at 9. 
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proposed: misappropriation of funds,120 inaccurate details 
provided by stakeholders when the technology was installed,121 or 
removal of installations because the community deemed them 
ineffective.122 
All three of these reasons appear to be problems that might be 
solved by better designed local laws that actually impose liability 
for engaging in fund misappropriation, inaccurate reporting from 
stakeholders, or removal—the type of thing that local governments 
do not necessarily have any incentive to enact as a result of soft 
national guidance.123 
The last of these reasons is particularly distressing, as it 
suggests that some lack of community acceptance, for whatever 
reason,124 has led to active ―disappearance‖ of government-
installed solutions.  Aside from this being a glaring example of 
poor government oversight, lack of acceptance suggests a society-
level barrier to successful implementation of arsenic mitigation 
plans.  Researchers at Dhaka University conducted a study of 
technology acceptance in three areas of Bangladesh—with varying 
quantities of installed arsenic technology—to examine the issue of 
this very type of barrier.125 
Before delving into the findings of these studies, it is important 
to note that a separate survey by APSU was needed to determine 
that these ―disappearances‖ were occurring in the first place.  The 
Bangladesh government did not have a centralized monitoring 
system in place at the time of the study; and it is unclear whether 
an effective centralized monitoring system is currently operating.  
The APSU suggested, when publishing its results, that sponsoring 
agencies supply Global Positioning System (―GPS‖) coordinates for 
each water supply installation for entry into a database126 and that 
 
120 Id. at 27. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
 123 See discussion supra Section 2.2.2. (Bangladesh‘s water management 
policies are non-binding and judicially unenforceable). 
124 These reasons may include a perception that the technology does not 
work, knowledge that it does not work, or a general reluctance to use the 
technology for cultural reasons. 
125 RAIHANA & HUSSAIN, supra note 94, at 9 (identifying the three studied 
regions—Pubail, Tilchandripur, and Araihazar—and describing the extent to 
which each region has seen contamination, arsenic mitigation intervention, and 
education regarding the problem). 
126 KABIR & HOWARD, supra note 118, at 27. 
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the government undertake periodic monitoring efforts utilizing 
this database.  Research gives no indication that these 
recommendations were incorporated into government policy.  It is 
also unclear that any such policy, if codified, has been enforced.  
Without change in the government‘s monitoring efforts, arsenic 
mitigation plans are bound to fail. 
In its study, APSU found worrisome figures.  Of all the 
surveyed technologies, only 64% of the water supply installations 
were functioning.127  For the most part, the malfunctioning 
installations were either providing insufficient quantities of water 
for the intended population—numbers that were perhaps 
unrealistically128 defined in the IPAMB129—or actually suffered 
from broken components.130  This latter explanation is perhaps 
predictable for pond sand filters and dug wells, both of which, by 
virtue of their low-lying design and use of shallow groundwater 
aquifers, are vulnerable to regular Bangladeshi flooding.131 
Rainwater harvesters also suffered significant implementation 
problems.  Utilizing Bangladesh‘s rain resources has been 
recommended by various observers,132 to the point of being 
considered ―the solution‖ due to the fact that it is plentiful and 
safe.133  But rainwater harvesters, according to APSU, seem to 
malfunction the most of all the recommended technologies; while 
this was a surprising find, it was attributed to lack of training 
regarding their use.134 
Afifa Raihana and A. Hussain, however, attribute rainwater 
harvesters‘ poor performance to users‘ social reluctance to use 
 
127 Id. at 10. 
128 Id. at 33 (pointing out the need for a more ―realistic estimate of the 
number of families served by individual options‖). 
129 Implementation Plan for Arsenic Mitigation in Bangladesh § 3.3.1 (2004) 
(recommending that at least one safe water source be available for every 50 
families). 
130 KABIR & HOWARD, supra note 118, at 11–14 (providing data regarding the 
quantity of arsenic mitigation installations that suffer from malfunctioning 
components). 
131 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 177–78. 
132 Id. at 179 (noting that home purification of collected rainwater was 
―widely touted‖ as a short term solution, with foreign aid helping to develop and 
advertise the technology). 
133 But see RAIHANA & HUSSAIN, supra note 94, at 115 (disagreeing with 
researchers who call rainwater ―the solution‖ because the option is not socially 
acceptable). 
134 KABIR & HOWARD, supra note 118, at 29. 
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rainwater.  Their study found an unusually low acceptability of 
rainwater with Bangladeshis.135  Thus, the feasibility of its 
implementation seems hampered by the fact that it is not ―socially 
acceptable.‖136 
This lack of acceptability might very well be overcome if the 
Bangladesh government was to take stronger measures 
incentivizing rainwater as a solution—India is a successful 
example of this.  The Indian government recognized the need to 
harvest rainwater and amended its building laws and zoning 
codes.137  This seems to have inspired states to change their laws.  
In at least ten Indian states, a method of rooftop rainwater 
harvesting is mandatory for buildings; additionally, the Indian 
government has installed such systems on government buildings 
in Delhi.138 
Internal Bangladeshi policy should also be updated to include 
more incentives and security for the caretakers of alternative water 
installations.  APSU found that 59% of the installations in its 
survey had regular maintenance.139  This is despite the fact that 
nearly all installations had a caretaker.140  The study found a 
(predictable) trend between proper caretaking and long-term 
functionality of the alternative water source; thus APSU 
recommended ―particular‖ government attention and 
development of caretakers of these technologies, through training 
and perhaps payment.141  It is unclear whether, without a stand on 
the issue from the national level, state governments or local 
governments will spontaneously enact such measures with any 
consistency. 
APSU also suggested a shift towards using deep tube-wells to 
minimize microbial and arsenic contamination, and because deep 
tube-wells are commonly preferred by communities due to their 
 
135 RAIHANA & HUSSAIN, supra note 94, at 115. 
136 Id. 
137 Peck & Griggs, supra note 84, at 356 (explaining that rainwater can be 
channeled from rooftop gutters into a storage tank for eventual filtering and use 
and that these gutter installations are subject to regulation by the state). 
138 Id. 
139 KABIR & HOWARD, supra note 118, at 19 (noting, further, that 87% of the 
working water supplies were receiving regular maintenance). 
140 Id. (―All but 7 (0.7%) of the water supplies had a caretaker.‖). 
141 Id. at 32 (concluding that caretakers are ―critical for the sustainability of 
the water supply‖ and ―[e]nhancing [caretakers‘] performance through support to 
water safety plans is likely to yield further benefits‖). 
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comparative reliability.142  Raihana and Hussain had the same 
finding regarding the popularity of community deep tube-wells as 
a long-term solution.143   
However, APSU notes that it has yet to be determined whether 
these can be sunk safely.144  Indeed, there are various obstacles:  
deep tube-wells are costlier to build than shallow tube-wells (by 45 
times), result in longer carrying distances for women, and are 
mistrusted by Bangladeshis in some villages; furthermore, the full 
implications of drilling deep tube-wells are unknown.145  As 
Meharg puts it, ―[e]ven geologists and hydrologists do not want to 
give the go-ahead for a massive program to sink deep tube-wells.  
They fear that these too could eventually become tainted, creating 
even more problems down the line.‖146 
In short, the optimal solution—and the solution that seems to 
have the best chance of long-term success—is difficult to pursue 
without significant government research.  It will be necessary to 
create—or complete, as the case may be—groundwater maps to 
identify safe aquifers that are protected from the penetration of 
arsenic via clay barriers.147  These objectives would be facilitated by 
an enforceable Groundwater Act, as argued for in Section 2.2.3. 
Further policy recommendations by APSU include an update 
of the IPAMB with cost-sharing provisions for installations 
(including payment for the caretakers), a more realistic estimate of 
the number of families served by individual technology 
implementations, and updated recommendations on technology 
types given new data from various studies that have been 
conducted on their efficacy148—all sensible suggestions which have 
not appeared in an updated Implementation Plan. 
 
142 Id. at 29. 
143 RAIHANA & HUSSAIN, supra note 94, at 107 (―The villagers opted for deeper 
tube-well [sic] as a long-term solution.‖). 
144 KABIR & HOWARD, supra note 118, at 33 (noting that ―deeper, older and 
safer aquifers need to be identified‖). 
145 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 179–80 (addressing the practical and social 
concerns of a large-scale deep tube-well implementation program). 
146 Id. at 180. 
147 KABIR & HOWARD, supra note 118, at 33. 
148 Id. 
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2.3. The Ignored Problem: Soil 
In the 1990s, an analytical chemist named Dipankar 
Chakraborti149 observed that arsenic content in toenails and hair 
were much higher than one would expect, given the supposed 
quantities of arsenic people were consuming through drinking 
water; people were being poisoned by some other source.150  
A large quantity of groundwater from shallow tube-wells is 
being used in fields for irrigation.151  Between 30% and 40% of the 
net cultivable area of Bangladesh is under irrigation and more than 
60% of the irrigation need is met from groundwater.152  
Groundwater use is particularly pronounced during the dry 
season, when vast quantities of water are pumped up to flood 
paddy fields; the arsenic in this water is left to collect atop the soil 
until, in the fortunate cases, monsoon floods wash away the 
contaminated sediment.153  This irrigation practice was personally 
observed by Meharg, who stated:  ―The poison was being liberally 
poured onto the most precious of all the delta‘s natural resources:  
its soil.  Not only has the miracle of clean water been turned sour—
the agricultural revolution is slowly poisoning the land.‖154  What 
is most alarming is that this problem seems to be largely ignored 
by both the Bangladeshi government and NGOs, despite the fact 
that arsenic in the food-chain may very well cause more serious 
long-term problems than arsenic in drinking-water155 and arsenic 
in soil will inflict long-term damage on Bangladesh‘s chance for 
recovery. 
A 2003 joint study conducted by the Bangladesh University of 
Engineering and the United Nations University on the subject of 
Bangladesh concluded that ―[a]rsenic builds up in topsoil when 
 
149 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 18. 
150 See S. M. Imamul Huq & Ravi Naidu, Arsenic in Groundwater of Bangladesh: 
Contamination in the Food Chain, in ARSENIC CONTAMINATION: BANGLADESH 
PERSPECTIVE 203, 206–07 (M. Feroze Ahmed ed., 2003) (discussing the possible 
transfer of arsenic to humans from various forms of food, including water-soil-
crops, which could account for the additional levels of arsenic contamination 
above what is found in the water supply). 
151 See Rahman Interview, supra note 24, at 12 (citing studies regarding 
groundwater use in irrigation). 
152 Huq & Naidu, supra note 150, at 204. 
153 See MEHARG, supra note 7, at 18. 
154 Id. 
155 Rahman Interview, supra note 24, at 12 (noting the looming but seemingly 
ignored danger of food chain contamination). 
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irrigated with arsenic contaminated water.‖156  Agricultural soils‘ 
arsenic content ―increases during irrigation with contaminated 
water but it is reduced during [the] post-irrigation period,‖ most 
likely due in part to leaching by flood or rainwater.157  While the 
study concluded that ―[a]rsenic content of soil does not build up to 
a critical level that affects growth of crops,‖158 there has been more 
recent concern that arsenic may reduce the yield of rice.159  
Arsenic collects in vegetables, particularly in leaves of low-
growing leafy plants160 like arum, gourd leaf, amaranathus, and 
ipomea161, as well as roots, like bitter gourd.162  Additionally, 
papaya, tomato, mayalu, green chili, jack fruit, and parwar contain 
significantly higher quantities of arsenic when irrigated by arsenic-
contaminated water than when grown in unaffected areas.163 
Arsenic in wheat and rice is mostly concentrated in roots and 
straws.164  As much as 1830 ppb arsenic has been found in rice 
grown in Bangladesh; 200 ppb is considered normal.165  Presence of 
the element in rice grain varies according to the variety of rice 
being considered.166  Arsenic is also found in grass used as 
fodder,167 which is fed to livestock and potentially transferred to 
meat.168 
Bangladeshi cooking practices are also tainted: rice stalks used 
for cooking can have higher concentrations of arsenic than 
contaminated drinking water and people breathe in arsenic-tainted 
 
156 M. Feroze Ahmed, Arsenic Contamination: Regional and Global Scenario, in 
ARSENIC CONTAMINATION: BANGLADESH PERSPECTIVE, supra note 150, at 1, 4. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 RAIHANA & HOSSAIN, supra note 94, at 27 box 3.3. 
160 See Huq & Naidu, supra note 150, at 215. 
161 See Indira Chakravarty et al., Arsenic in Food Chain—A Study on Both Raw 
and Cooked Food, in ARSENIC CONTAMINATION: BANGLADESH PERSPECTIVE, supra note 
150, at 227, 236. 
162 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 18. 
163 See Chakravarty et al., supra note 161, at 235 (providing data that supports 
the contention that vegetables contain higher levels of arsenic when irrigated with 
arsenic-contaminated water). 
164 Id. at 236. 
165 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 18. 
166 Chakravarty et al., supra note 161, at 236. 
167 Id. 
168 See Huq & Naidu, supra note 150, at 214 (speculating on the possibility of 
arsenic lingering in meat after livestock eats contaminated fodder). 
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fumes when they cook.169  Contaminated rice can contribute as 
much or more arsenic to the diet as a tube-well—especially where 
it is cooked in contaminated water.170 
Indeed, many types of food retain arsenic through use of 
arsenic-contaminated water in cooking,171 including tea, diluted 
milk, dal, potato curry, and certain preparations of rice.172  Oddly 
enough, a separate study found that arsenic is not retained in lentil 
soup, one of the staple foods of rural Bangladesh cuisine.173 
The contaminated soil is perhaps the most urgent reason why 
Bangladesh needs to seriously pursue the drastic reduction of 
groundwater use.  Getting people to stop drinking tube-well water 
is necessary but insufficient; the Bangladesh government must 
eliminate the use of tube-well water to irrigate rice paddies. 
As Meharg notes, ―[t]he quantities of water required for 
cultivation are so vast that it would be uneconomical to rid the 
water of arsenic.‖174  The solution, then, is to secure sufficient 
arsenic-free surface water—from river water and ponds—to halt 
the poisoning and destruction of Bangladesh‘s agricultural 
foundations.  As will be discussed in Section 4, this might be done 
through the use of international law and large-scale surface water 
augmentation projects.   
Sadly, even this is only a partial solution—cessation of the use 
of tube-well water for irrigation would merely leave the poison 
where the food grows and arsenic present in the soil would 
remain.175  Still, this problem cannot be solved merely through 
internal means.  Surface water is needed.  If Bangladesh is to rely 
more on surface water, it needs to turn to international law. 
 
169 Rahman Interview, supra note 24, at 12. 
170 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 18. 
171 Huq & Naidu, supra note 150, at 222 (charting the arsenic levels in a 
variety of foods cooked with arsenic-contaminated water as opposed to grown 
with arsenic-contaminated water). 
172 Chakravarty et al., supra note 161, at 237–38 (cataloguing heightened levels 
of arsenic in common Bangladeshi foods when prepared with arsenic-
contaminated water). 
173 Id. at 239. 
174 MEHARG, supra note 7, at 18. 
175 Id. at 19. 
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3. OBSTACLES TO RELYING ON SURFACE WATER 
The goal articulated by the Bangladeshi government of 
encouraging its population to again rely on surface water is not 
easy to accomplish.  The logistical and social difficulties are 
explored in Section 2.2 which details the way in which the 
country‘s arsenic mitigation efforts—largely consisting of attempts 
to install temporary water provision alternatives—have 
encountered difficulties. 
Additionally, as noted by UNICEF, reliance on surface water is 
only truly feasible after dealing with what is possibly a larger 
problem of waterborne microbial contaminants,176 a threat 
Bangladesh faced in the past and hoped to resolve by turning to 
groundwater.  A sudden switch to surface water would force 
Bangladesh to revisit early decades of mass sickness and death 
caused by drinking contaminated river water. 
These problems are, however, in a sense, ―luxury‖ problems.  
They are only addressed if there is water available in the first place.  
For a truly effective surface water solution, Bangladesh must first 
(or at the very least simultaneously) work to secure a sufficient 
quantity of surface water.   
This is especially important because Bangladesh‘s agricultural 
reliance on groundwater must also be transferred elsewhere.  The 
concern regarding biological waterborne disease, fortunately, is 
lessened in the context of water used for agriculture.  Microbes in 
harvested food are dealt with at least partially through cooking, 
cleaning and processing crops.  However, arsenic that has collected 
in the soil will continue to infiltrate the food chain.  As discussed in 
Section 2.3, the poison has a tenacious tendency to linger.  Arsenic 
is a long-term problem. 
Given Bangladesh‘s consumption and agricultural needs, we 
can conclude that for arsenic mitigation practices to be effective, 
more surface water will be necessary for the population to use.  If 
more surface water is not attained, the population, faced with the 
lack of surface water, will turn in its thirst to generously-provided 
and readily-available poisonous groundwater. 
 
176 See id. at 178 (quoting a 1999 UNICEF report, which noted that ―[h]astily 
and indiscriminately switching back to surface water across the country without 
strong pollution control measures in place will most likely do more harm than 
good to the people of Bangladesh‖). 
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In short, Bangladesh, must ensure that there is enough surface 
water upon which to apply newly designed sanitation technology 
and processes. 
This is easier said than done.  This section will examine the 
roadblocks Bangladesh faces in attempting to secure such water.  It 
will (1) consider the difficulties of negotiating for more water 
through treaties, and (2) identify the dangers of upper riparian 
damming practices such as the upcoming Indian IBWT Project, 
which will exacerbate Bangladesh‘s plight.   
3.1. Difficulty of Securing Surface Water Through Treaty Negotiation 
There are many rivers that traverse between India and 
Bangladesh.177  Despite this abundance, there is only one treaty178 
 
177 There are fifty-seven transboundary rivers in Bangladesh; fifty-four are 
shared with India.  Bangladesh, supra note 11.  The remaining three are shared with 
Myanmar.  Id. 
178 There seems to have been progress forging a second treaty that will 
govern the waters of the Teesta River, one of the transboundary rivers that 
Bangladesh and India share.  See Talks with B’desh on River Water Sharing, 
HINDUSTAN TIMES (India), Jan. 10, 2011, http://www.hindustantimes.com/Talks-
with-B-desh-on-river-water-sharing/H1-Article1-648634.aspx (reporting that talks 
from 2010 resumed between India and Bangladesh regarding sharing common 
rivers and noting the Bangladeshi expectation of a 15-year interim treaty on 
Teesta, as well as the likelihood of discussions on ―a short-term treaty‖ for sharing 
the waters of the southern Feni river).  Teesta has suffered from reduced flows 
during the last quarter century.  India, Bangladesh to Discuss Teesta River Water 
Sharing, OUTLOOK INDIA, Jan. 4, 2010, http://news.outlookindia.com/item.aspx 
?672113 (―[T]he flow of the river weakened significantly in the last 24 years for 
Gajoldoba barrage and some dams in the upstream Indian region.  In February 
and March, it comes down to less than 1,000 cubic feet per second, from 5,000 
cubic feet per second in December and January . . .‖).  As yet, no treaty on Teesta 
has been signed.  Anisur Rahman, India Dominates B’desh Political, Foreign Scene in 
2010, OUTLOOK INDIA, Dec. 23, 2010, http://news.outlookindia.com/item.aspx 
?706099 (―[T]wo sides were yet to strike even an interim deal on the issue . . . .‖).  
This is despite signs of progress throughout 2010.  In January 2010, India and 
Bangladesh held secretary-level talks to reach an agreement on the Teesta treaty, 
and Bangladesh indicated that it was amenable to a temporary deal to establish a 
foundation for the desired long-term deal.  See India, Bangladesh to Discuss Teesta 
River Water Sharing, supra (describing both parties‘ commitment towards 
establishing an agreement, if not a treaty); see also Govt Wants Deals On All 
Common Rivers, BDNEWS24.COM (Bangl.), Jan. 23, 2010, http://bdnews24.com 
/details.php?id=151790&cid=2 (noting that there was an express desire to reach 
an agreement on all rivers).  In March 2010, the Joint Rivers Commission (―JRC‖) 
(see infra notes 216-22 and accompanying text for more information regarding the 
JRC) met after a years-long hiatus to discuss the Teesta river and exchange drafts 
of water sharing agreements, and the outlook was optimistic.  See, e.g., India, 
Bangladesh to Discuss Teesta Water-Sharing, HINDU (India), Mar. 17, 2010, 
http://beta.thehindu.com/news/national/article253918.ece (discussing an 
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to date that governs one river system (at minimum179).  This leaves 
Bangladesh in a vulnerable position.  India and upper riparians can 
argue—due to a lack of concretely governing international law180—
that they need not pay attention to lower riparian needs when 
determining what to do with rivers that are arguably unregulated 
by any treaty.  The obvious solution for Bangladesh would be to 
enter into treaty negotiations for these rivers. 
Unfortunately, as Meharg has observed, any goal to obtain 
water from transboundary rivers via political negotiations with 
India is complicated.181  For one thing, it seems difficult to bring 
upper riparians to the treaty bargaining table, because they have 
no incentive (by virtue of geographic or economic realities) to 
negotiate a water sharing treaty when they can choose to take as 
 
upcoming JRC meeting to review Teesta water-sharing); India, Bangladesh 
Exchange Drafts [Accords] on Teesta Water-Sharing, TIMES OF INDIA, Mar. 20, 2010, 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-Bangladesh-exchange-draft-
accords-on-Teesta-water-sharing/articleshow/5703608.cms (reporting on the 
significant breakthrough in negotiations for the two nations when they exchanged 
draft water-sharing agreements); India, Bangladesh Hold Talks on River Water, SIFY 
NEWS (India), Mar. 18, 2010, http://sify.com/news/india-bangladesh-hold-talks-
on-river-water-news-national-kdsrkecdagb.html (describing Teesta interim 
agreement talks between Bangladesh and India); India-Bangladesh Water Sharing 
Agreement on Teesta Soon, BOMBAYNEWS.NET (India), Mar. 20, 2010, http://www 
.bombaynews.net/story/614333 (reporting that India and Bangladesh were 
moving closer to a Teesta water-sharing agreement); Secys Asked to Examine 
Dhaka’s Draft on Teesta, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Mar. 20, 2010, http://www 
.thedailystar.net/newDesign/latest_news.php?nid=22780 (noting that talks on the 
Teesta water treaty had intensified).  However, something stalled the process, and 
Bangladesh ultimately expressed frustration at the lack of progress.  See Anisur 
Rahman, B’desh Wants to Expedite Water Cooperation with India, OUTLOOK INDIA, 
Nov. 7, 2010, http://news.outlookindia.com/item.aspx?700312 (―Peeved by the 
inordinate delay in reaching agreements on water sharing with India, Bangladesh 
Foreign Minister Dipu Moni has said that at this rate the two neighbours would 
need ‗a millennium‘ to sign deals on 54 common rivers.‖); Kamran Reza 
Chowdhury, Dhaka Presses for JRC Talks on Teesta Deal, BDNEWS24.COM (Bangl.), 
Nov. 21, 2009, http://bdnews24.com/details.php?id=147503&cid=2 (reporting 
the difficulties of arranging productive meetings with India on the matter of water 
sharing). 
179 It is possible that the 1996 Ganges Treaty governs, to some extent, the use 
and sharing agreements of other transboundary rivers.  See generally discussion 
infra Section 4.1.2 discussing protection under the 1996 Ganges Treaty.  
180 International law might impose obligations upon upper riparian nations 
and India.  See generally discussion infra Section 4.1.3 (discussing regulation of 
international rivers and recent trends).  
181 See MEHARG, supra note 7, at 19 (observing that the construction of dams to 
divert water flowing from transnational rivers has been a source of political 
tension in Bangladesh‘s history). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss3/3
SARWAR.DOC 3/18/2011  9:26 PM 
2011] ARSENIC MITIGATION IN BANGLADESH 873 
much of the water as they need or want without significant 
negative consequences from the lower riparian.  In theory, in the 
case of India, there is a legal obligation to come to the negotiating 
table imposed on both it and Bangladesh by the 1996 Ganges 
Treaty,182 though the extent or enforceability of this obligation is 
unclear.  Thus far, it has seemed somewhat ineffectual:  to date 
there has been limited success compelling India to adhere to this 
obligation, and lack of clarity as to whether Bangladesh has made 
sufficient effort to impose adherence to this term of the 1996 
Treaty.183  Some observers also claim an obligation to utilize the 
1996 Treaty as a template of a ―framework‖ for future treaties184 —a 
contention that is arguably limited in its benefits.  
 
182 See generally 1996 Ganges Treaty, supra note 30, art. IX (indicating that both 
governments agree to conclude water-sharing agreements with respect to other 
rivers). 
183 We can point to several pieces of evidence supporting this.  First, the Joint 
Rivers Commission—an organization that is a focal point for negotiating efforts 
between India and Bangladesh (for more information regarding the JRC, see infra 
notes 216–22 and accompanying text)—meets inconsistently.  While part of this is 
reluctance on India‘s part, some note that the functionality of the group seems to 
be dictated by prevailing political mood in Bangladesh: 
The JRC could not meet even once in three consecutive years during the 
late 80s because there was no political interest on the Indian side (the JRC 
is supposed to meet four or more times a year).  When Awami League 
(AL) came into power in mid 1996, the JRC met several times and a 30-
year Ganges Treaty could be drafted and signed within a few months of 
AL‘s coming into power. 
Shamim Ahsan, India’s Giant River-Link Project: Will Bangladesh Dry Up?, STAR 
MAG., Oct. 10, 2003,  http://www.thedailystar.net/magazine/2003/10/02 
/coverstory.htm.  Second, we can look at the markedly slow process of 
negotiating the Teesta River sharing agreement, which, as noted before, has been 
a longstanding concern.  Despite apparent activity in 2010, negotiations have not 
culminated in a treaty or interim deal.  Rahman, India Dominates B’desh Political, 
Foreign Scene in 2010, supra note 178.  Note, however, that India has committed to 
working with Bangladesh to forge new treaties and agreements to ensure 
preservation of Bangladesh‘s interests.  See Khondkar A. Saleque, Ice Melting in 
Indo-Bangla Relation, ENERGY BANGLA, (Jan. 13, 2010, 1:21 AM), 
http://www.energybangla.com/index.php?mod=article&cat=SomethingtoSay&a
rticle=2357 (describing the various commitments India made in January 2010 
regarding water-sharing issues including and beyond the sharing of the Teesta 
River, such as: a promise of no harm from the Tipamiukh Dam; a commitment to 
working out issues related to the Feni, Muhuri, Khowai, Dharala and Dudkumar 
rivers; the dredging of the Ichamati river; and the protection of the Mahananda, 
Karotoa, Nagar, Kulik, Atrai, Dharala and Feni rivers). 
184 See, e.g., Surya P. Subedi, Hydro-Diplomacy in South Asia: The Conclusion of 
the Mahakali and Ganges River Treaties, 93 AM. J. INT‘L L. 953, 960 (1999) (arguing that 
since the 1996 Treaty also ―lays down the . . . principles . . . of future agreements 
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As further evidence of the difficulty of relying upon treaty 
negotiation, it is worthwhile to note that the 1996 Ganges Treaty—
despite its benefits—is flawed in fundamental ways.  The history of 
the formation of the 1996 Ganges Treaty highlights a potentially 
grim set of conclusions regarding these flaws:  overwhelmingly 
negative effects of bargaining inequities between Bangladesh and 
its neighbors result in the absence of important water-sharing 
provisions, effective dispute resolution mechanisms, and perhaps 
necessitate the use of third-party arbitration. 
3.1.1. Impact of the 1996 Ganges Treaty on Subsequent Treaties 
Article IX of the Ganges Treaty directs the governments of 
India and Bangladesh to conclude water-sharing agreements for 
other common rivers.185  It directs the two countries to conclude 
these treaties with ―due consideration to the principles of equity, 
fairness and no harm.‖186 
Unfortunately, this aspect of the Treaty has seen little 
enforcement.  Note how the mandate of Article IX is remarkably 
vague; it gives no guidelines or structure to the obligation of 
creating new treaties.  It does not indicate when or under what 
circumstances new water-sharing agreements for the numerous 
other rivers between India and Bangladesh should be forged.  
There seems to be nothing in the treaty‘s text preventing India 
from delaying the process indefinitely, or from compelling an 
incompetent or distracted Bangladesh from neglecting its surface 
water interests.   
Noting this conscious decision to include language whose 
scope lies beyond the technical matter of sharing water for just the 
Ganges, some observers—as mentioned before—argue that the 
treaty is a ―framework‖ treaty that governs future water-sharing 
agreements between Bangladesh and India.  This is a valuable 
observation, but might be of limited usefulness for several reasons. 
First, the argument presumes that India will come to the 
bargaining table to form new treaties in the first place, which, as 
noted before, is not necessarily a reasonable given.  Indeed, 
because India seems to have little to gain from such treaties, it is 
 
on other common rivers;‖ it is a ―framework treaty,‖ in addition to having a 
―technical character‖). 
185 1996 Ganges Treaty, supra note 30, art. IX. 
186 Id. 
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unclear how Bangladesh could even begin to make a ―framework‖ 
treaty argument. 
Second, it is unclear—given the Treaty‘s shortcomings, which 
will be discussed in Section 3.1.2—whether the Ganges Treaty is a 
worthwhile framework to utilize.  As observers have noted, there 
are some attractive aspects.  One is the Treaty‘s use and placement 
of the ―no harm‖ principle.  This principle—sometimes called the 
―obligation not to cause appreciable harm‖—is an international 
custom187 that limits a state‘s right to act in a manner that impinges 
upon the rights of other states.  In other words, the principle seems 
to imply that a lower riparian might assert rights in the event that 
an upper riparian is inflicting significant damage to it.  The Ganges 
Treaty specifically includes mention of the ―no harm‖ rule as well 
as the principle of equitable use,188 and, rather unusually,189 
 
187 Abu R. M. Khalid has suggested that the principle ―receives wide 
recognition today as a general principle of international law,‖ having been 
articulated in the soft-law Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment and 
applied in the Trail Smelter Arbitration between the United States and Canada.  
Abu R. M. Khalid, The Interlinking of Rivers Project in India and International Water 
Law: An Overview, 3 CHINESE J. INT‘L L. 553, 563 (2004).  The former‘s articulation of 
the no harm rule can be found in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their 
own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control 
do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 
Swed., June 5-16, 1972, Action Taken by the Conference 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48 
/14/Rev.1 (1973).  In the latter, meanwhile, the tribunal, considering damage 
caused to the United States—via air pollution—by a smelter in Canada, found 
that: 
[U]nder the principles of international law . . . no State has the right to 
use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury 
by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons 
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is 
established by clear and convincing evidence. 
Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), Decision, 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (Apr. 1938). 
188 See infra notes 208–13, 297–303, and accompanying text. 
189 I characterize this as unusual only because the Treaty seems to explicitly 
buck the trend identified by some observers of favoring equitable use principles 
over the no harm rule.  Subedi points to the (un-ratified) 1997 UN Watercourse 
Convention, which downplays the no harm rule and emphasizes the principle of 
reasonable and equitable use.  Subedi, supra note 184, at 961.  See also Convention 
on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, arts. 5–7, 
May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 (1997). 
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appears to favor neither.190  Thus, if Bangladesh were able to bring 
India back to the table for new treaty negotiations regarding the 
many shared rivers that can currently be used with few 
international legal ramifications, it might have at its disposal the 
ability to incorporate the no harm rule into subsequent agreements.  
Again, as will be discussed in Section 3.1.2, given the Ganges 
Treaty‘s shortcomings, perhaps this advantage is an insufficient 
incentive to keep the Treaty as anything but a lessons-learned 
document.191  While the Treaty was indeed a breakthrough on 
many levels, it might do Bangladesh well to start fresh for other 
rivers. 
Note, finally, the argument that the Ganges Treaty is a 
―framework‖ treaty—aside from potentially being moot—is also 
weakened by the final sentence in the preamble, which indicates 
provisions of the treaty are not meant to give rise ―to any general 
principles of law or precedent.‖192  India would almost certainly 
utilize this clause to argue against allowing Bangladesh to use the 
Ganges Treaty for its benefit (and potentially to the detriment of 
India) in future treaty formation.   
3.1.2. Oversights and Flaws in the 1996 Ganges Treaty 
As Meharg notes, the construction of dams to divert and 
regulate the Ganges River has been a source of political tension 
between India and Bangladesh since Bangladesh gained 
independence.193  The Ganges Treaty was a significant step in the 
relations between the two countries.  It is a long-term solution to 
 
190 See 1996 Ganges Treaty, supra note 30, art. IX (stating that the parties are 
―guided by the principles of equity, fairness and no harm‖).  Subedi suggests that 
this means the two principles are given ―equal footing,‖ noting: 
If the no-harm rule and equitable utilization are given equal weight, a 
lower riparian state in a parched region with fully utilized rivers might 
claim that any use of the watercourse by an upper riparian state would 
be harmful to it.  This is one reason why an upper riparian state is likely 
to benefit more from adoption of the international law principle of 
equitable and reasonable utilization than from the principle of no harm. 
Subedi, supra note 184, at 961. 
191 Further, as Subedi notes, ―[t]he parties‘ agreement to conclude other 
treaties, however, does not extend to such matters as the management, 
conservation and prevention of pollution of their common rivers.‖  Subedi, supra 
note 184, at 960. 
192 1996 Ganges Treaty, supra note 30, at 523. 
193 See MEHARG, supra note 7, at 18–19. 
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what had been years of conflict:  a thirty-year194 agreement 
renewable by mutual consent,195 and reviewed every five years (or 
as required by either party).196  The arrangement basically attempts 
to ensure that Bangladesh is not entirely deprived of water during 
the region‘s dry seasons as a result of the Farakka Barrage, a 
structure that was built—without Bangladesh‘s consent—to allow 
India to divert flows from the Ganges River.197 
Some observers consider the treaty to be a breakthrough 
achievement, one that, as speculated by James Kraska, injected a 
―sense of fairness and equality into the diplomacy‖ between 
Bangladesh and India.198  Like other water-sharing agreements in 
South Asia, the treaty potentially helped strengthen political ties, 
ameliorated regional tensions, and reduced the likelihood of war 
by inserting ―new ingredients‖ into long-standing disputes:  
assurance, verification, institution-building, process-building, 
constituent building, and principle development.199  It was, 
according to some, ―a great achievement in the history of Indo-
Bangladesh negotiations on the Ganges,‖ and removed a ―major 
irritant‖ between the two nations.200 
Despite these rather lofty benefits, the Ganges Treaty has its 
flaws. 
For one thing, the agreement may assume that a higher level of 
water is available in the Ganges River during the dry season than 
actually is – an assumption that was revealed as seemingly false as 
 
194 1996 Ganges Treaty, supra note 30, art. XII. 
195 Id. 
196 See id. art. X.  A joint survey on Padma flow began on January 1, 2011—to 
take place 6 days a week, until May 31—pursuant to the Ganges Treaty.  See Joint 
survey on Padma flow, BDNEWS24.COM (Bangl.), Jan. 1, 2011, http://bdnews24.com 
/details.php?cid=2&id=183204. 
197 See Khan, supra note 3, at 470 (noting that the aim of the Ganges Treaty is 
to ensure that Bangladesh receives water during the region‘s dry seasons).  This 
water is diverted into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly river of West Bengal to flush silts 
and to improve navigability of the Port of Calcutta.  Id. at 471. 
198 See James Kraska, Sustainable Development is Security: The Role of 
Transboundary River Agreements as a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) in South 
Asia, 28 YALE J. INT‘L L. 465, 495 (2003).  
199 Id. at 492 (listing beneficial elements introduced into the South Asian 
geopolitical realm as a result of international river agreements). 
200 See Khan, supra note 3, at 470.  
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early as 1997,201 and which has not been adequately addressed due 
to shortcomings in the Treaty‘s dispute resolution provisions.202 
The impact of this flaw is amplified by the Treaty‘s lack of a 
flow augmentation plan, which would have resulted in a 
collaborative project between the countries to increase the flow of 
the Ganges by leveraging other surface water resources.203  The 
Ganges Treaty quietly acknowledges the correction of this 
conceptual incompleteness as a worthy future goal.204  The lack of 
such a plan is particularly tragic because it was the subject of a 
protracted and consistent disagreement between India and 
Bangladesh, and resulted in a delay in the Treaty‘s formation.205   
Additionally, some have noted that the Ganges Treaty is 
―overwhelmingly concerned‖ with sharing water during dry 
seasons and does not recognize the fact that the river floods 
severely in the monsoon season.206  India diverts water away from 
Bangladesh when the river runs low and then uses Farakka to 
allow the Ganges to flood Bangladesh when the river runs 
destructively high during the monsoon season.207 
Note that attempts to fix these flaws are theoretically possible 
through the dispute resolution mechanisms contained within the 
Treaty.  However, it can be argued that these mechanisms are also 
 
201 See Salman M.A. Salman & Kishor Uprety, Hydro-Politics in South Asia: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Mahakali and the Ganges Treaties, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 
295, 327-28 (1999) (detailing Bangladesh‘s 1997 claims regarding the depleted 
flows of the Ganges, and India‘s reaction). 
202 See id. at 337 (―[W]hen the Ganges flow was below the thresholds specified 
in the Ganges Treaty, each of the countries . . . insisted on an interpretation of its 
relevant provisions in ways that suited them most.  This obviously led to non-
resolution and increased tension between the countries.‖). 
203 See id. at 330. 
204 See 1996 Ganges Treaty, supra note 30, art. IX (―The two Governments 
recognise the need to cooperate with each other in finding a solution to the long-
term problem of augmenting the flows of the Ganga/Ganges during the dry 
season.‖). 
205 See Khan, supra note 3, at 462–69 (detailing the role augmentation had in 
the discussions between Bangladesh and India, its delaying effect upon the 
proceedings, and its ultimate ―delinking‖ from the issue of sharing). 
206 See Khalid, supra note 187, at 560. 
207 See id. (noting that India has ―showed substantial efforts‖ to ensure its 
control on lean season flow but has ―failed to demonstrate the same degree of 
enthusiasm to get its proportionate share of the devastating monsoon season 
water flow‖); MEHARG, supra note 7, at 19 (―During the dry season India siphons 
off the precious Ganges waters; during the flood seasons it opens the gates, 
unleashing torrents of water into Bangladesh.‖). 
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the largest flaw built into the 1996 Ganges Treaty.  Due to reliance 
on political negotiations, these mechanisms are stacked in favor of 
India. 
The Ganges Treaty relies, in part, on an equitable utilization 
principle,208 which was articulated in the UN Convention on the 
Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
(―1997 Watercourse Convention‖).209  It states that waters are to be 
―used and developed . . . taking into account the interests of the 
watercourse States concerned, consistent with adequate protection 
of the watercourse.‖210  As can be seen, the doctrine maintains 
seemingly purposeful vagueness and a lack of concrete rights to 
water use.211  It encourages, instead, that rights be assigned on a 
case-by-case basis.  Some scholars have argued that this vagueness 
is in place in order to eliminate a sense of entitlement to water and 
encourage negotiations.212  Unfortunately for Bangladesh, while 
this does leave the door open for the country to negotiate its way to 
more rights and a fairer distribution of water based upon its needs, 
this door is not easily traversed, given the unevenness in 
bargaining power between India and Bangladesh.213 
We can see the embrace of negotiation as an equitable solution 
in the dispute resolution mechanisms of the Ganges Treaty:  they 
ultimately fall back upon the respective country‘s political powers.  
Article IV of the Treaty establishes a Joint Committee consisting of 
equal numbers of representatives nominated by each government 
for issues of dispute resolution.214  Article VII dictates that disputes 
related to the operation of the Farakka Barrage or the Treaty that 
 
208 Analysis of this principle—and suggestions regarding ways in which it 
can be used to Bangladesh‘s advantage—are discussed infra Section 4.1.3. 
209 See generally Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, supra note 189. 
210 Id. art. 5, para. 1. 
211 Michael Keene, The Failings of the Tri-State Water Negotiations: Lessons to be 
Learned from International Law, 32 GA. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 473, 495–96 (2004) (noting 
that the doctrine of equitable utilization lacks both specificity and permanent 
rights to water use). 
212 See id. at 496 (―Parties to a discussion who believe that they possess 
inalienable rights are liable to be uncompromising.  Concrete rights to water 
usage create a feeling of entitlement that can be stifling to negotiation.‖).  
213 See generally id. at 496–97 (detailing how the vague parameters and flexible 
standards of rights under the doctrine of equitable utilization allow for equitable 
negotiations in cases in which the parties have relatively similar bargaining 
power). 
214 See 1996 Ganges Treaty, supra note 30, art. IV. 
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cannot be resolved by the Joint Committee float over to the Indo-
Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission (―JRC‖) for resolution.215 
The JRC is an older entity that was signed into existence in 
November 1972,216 after Bangladesh‘s independence, and played a 
central role in the formation of the Ganges Treaty.217  Its purpose is 
to work together ―in harnessing the rivers common to both the 
countries for the benefit of the peoples of the two countries,‖ and 
―to ensure the most effective joint efforts in maximizing the 
benefits of common river systems.‖218  However, the JRC sits only 
occasionally—most recently, as noted before,219 after a particularly 
prolonged delay220 to attempt to hash out a water sharing 
agreement for the sharing of the Teesta River221—and is considered 
by some as ineffective.222  The Treaty perhaps contemplates this 
 
215 Id. art. VII. 
216 See generally Statute of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission 
(1972), available at http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents 
/regionaldocs/indo-bangladesh.html (providing the text of the Statute of the 
Indo-Banldadesh Joint Rivers Commission, which was signed on November 24, 
1972 in Dhaka). 
217 See generally Khan, supra note 3, at 462–70 (providing a detailed 
chronological account of the JRC‘s role in treaty negotiations between India and 
Bangladesh, including its dormancy and reactivation in the early 1990s). 
218 Statute of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission (1972). 
219 See supra note 178. 
220 See Chowdhury, supra note 178 (reporting that ―the commission had failed 
to hold any talks for the last six years‖).  Note that this delay occurred despite the 
discussion of important matters during the previous meeting of the JRC.  See 
Balaji Reddy, India and Bangladesh Disagree on Teesta Water and Construction of 
Tipaimukh Dam—Source of Another Round of Confrontation?, INDIA DAILY, Sept. 22, 
2005, http://www.indiadaily.com/editorial/4673.asp (describing the discussions 
that took place during the September 2005 ministerial JRC meeting). 
221 See supra note 178 (noting progress forging a second treaty that will 
govern the Teesta River despite stalled attempts in the past).  
222 See Khalid, supra note 187, at 560 (―In actuality, the JRC has been almost 
ineffective for a long period and sits only occasionally.‖).  This infrequency of 
meetings occurs reportedly despite protests from Bangladesh.  See Hemayetuddin 
Ahmed, Foreign Policy Conundrum: India Factor, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Oct. 31, 2009, 
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=111986 (―There 
had been no meetings of the JRC at all for the last four years.  Repeated reminders 
for the meetings and reportedly SOS from Bangladesh side had gone in vain.‖).  
See also Ahsan, supra note 183 (questioning the efficacy of the JRC and providing 
various suggestions to fulfill its conceptual potential: public dissemination of 
activities and functions, to increase accountability and credibility; regular 
collection and sharing of data on the quantity and quality of common waters; and 
remedial measures to make it a more forceful recommending body, including 
reducing the number of engineers as part of its required makeup, in order to 
move away from overly technical solutions). 
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and transfers the dispute settlement power—in the event that 
neither the Joint Committee nor the JRC can come to a resolution—
to the political authority of the two countries.223  This is instead of 
opting for a more impartial dispute resolution framework such as 
independent arbitration—which, as Salman and Uprety note, 
maintains the advantages of negotiation and works quite well in 
the context of India and Nepal under the Mahakali Treaty, but 
does not leave the weaker country entirely vulnerable to the 
whims of the stronger.224 
3.1.3. Overwhelming Effects of Bargaining Inequity 
The discussion in Section 3.1.2 regarding ill-designed dispute 
resolution mechanisms in the 1996 Ganges Treaty brings to light a 
general concern that Bangladesh must deal with in any attempt to 
negotiate water sharing from upstream—bargaining inequities.  
This is perhaps particularly true when the negotiating parties are 
not similarly situated from an economic and military standpoint.  
The negotiation of the 1996 Ganges Treaty exemplifies how 
difficult such negotiations can be. 
The story of the Treaty begins with an Indian structure that 
embodies the bargaining inequities between the nations:  the 
Farakka Barrage.  The Farakka Barrage represents the type of 
control India can exert by virtue of its comparative economic and 
military might and its position as an upper riparian.  India was 
(and continues to be) in the position to drown or parch its neighbor 
as it wished (and wishes).  Since the Ganges Treaty was a response 
to this type of power, it is reasonable to glean that the final product 
is somewhat lopsided. 
The Farakka Barrage, a 1.4 mile (2,245 meter) irrigation dam,225 
was built 11 miles above stream from the border of Bangladesh.226  
 
223 The Treaty states that the dispute will be turned over ―to the two 
Governments which shall meet urgently at the appropriate level to resolve it by 
mutual consent.‖  1996 Ganges Treaty, supra note 30, art. VII.  See infra Section 
3.1.3 for a discussion regarding why relying upon political processes might not be 
ideal. 
224 See generally Salman & Uprety, supra note 201, at 337–38 (comparing the 
presence of an arbitration mechanism in the Mahakali Treaty favorably to the lack 
of such a mechanism in the Ganges Treaty). 
225 MINISTRY OF WATER RES., THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION BILL 2004 OF THE 
FARAKKA BARRAGE PROJECT, REPLY OF ITEM NO.4 OF CHAPTER-II 2 (India), available at 
http://wrmin.nic.in/writereaddata/linkimages/fb_rtia9734330785.pdf. 
226 Khan, supra note 3, at 460–61. 
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It was designed to divert 40,000 cusecs of a river227 whose normal 
flow was, at the time, assumed to be as high as 50,000 to 55,000 
cusecs during the dry season228 (an estimate shown to be 
potentially unrepresentative229).  The intention was not sinister on 
the part of India—the primary purpose of Farakka was to divert 
water into the Hooghly River to improve the navigability of 
Calcutta port and prevent it from silting.230 
Regardless of the efficacy of the dam and its purported goals,231 
Bangladesh suffered downstream of Farakka.  In our limited 
 
227 MINISTRY OF WATER RES., supra note 225, at 2. 
228 Salman & Uprety, supra note 201, at 305. 
229 Id. at 327 (indicating that actual water flow according to Bangladesh was 
considerably lower than the amount estimated as early as 1997). 
230 This goal was confirmed by India‘s Ministry of Water Resources in 
response to an order to release information to the public pursuant to India‘s Right 
to Information Act.  MINISTRY OF WATER RES., supra note 225, at 1.  Other goals 
were to counteract high salinity in the water and to provide Calcutta with water 
for irrigation, domestic, and municipal purposes.  Salman & Uprety, supra note 
201, at 304. 
231 India‘s Ministry of Water Resources claims: 
With the completion of the Farakka Barrage, silt free water now flows 
throughout the year in the river Hooghly.  This has increased the 
navigable depth in the riverine approach of the port and it enables to 
receive large size ships and handle bigger volume of cargo, thereby 
improving the economy of the vast hinterland. 
MINISTRY OF WATER RES., supra note 225, at 2.  However, note that the project was 
pursued despite skepticism from various international experts—including those 
within India—who doubted that periodic diversions of 40,000 cusecs could indeed 
save Calcutta from silting.  See Khan, supra note 3, at 470–72 (describing initial 
skepticism of the Farakka Barrage‘s likelihood of success).  Farakka ultimately did 
not have the intended effect.  Decades later, Calcutta port continues to silt.  See 
Sankar Ray, An Environmental Mistake in India, ASIA SENTINEL, Sept. 12, 2008, 
http://asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1429&It
emid=34 (―If ever there was a lesson in the unintended effects of damming rivers, 
[it is] the Farakka Barrage . . . threatening to wreak havoc on a series of 
downstream villages and ultimately silt up the Kolkata harbor, the condition it 
was partly designed to fix.‖); Khan, supra note 3, at 470–72 (summarizing the 
subsequent evidence of Farakka‘s ultimate failure to achieve its goal of ―flushing 
out‖ the Calcutta port).  See also Kolkata Port: Government Support Vital, HINDU BUS. 
LINE, Nov. 19, 2001, available at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com 
/businessline/logistic/2001/11/19/stories/0919c05s.htm (noting the flow from 
Farakka‘s role on downstream silting).  This is because the water from upstream 
brought its own massive silt deposits, all of which were dropped behind the dam, 
reducing the overall flow through Farakka.  Julian Crandall Hollick, Ganges Dam 
Leaves Devastating Legacy, NAT‘L PUB. RADIO, December 23, 2007, http://www 
.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17357750.  One observer has argued 
that India acknowledged this was happening by developing Haldia, a nearby 
deep sea port which is equipped for large oceangoing vessels and gradually 
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context, Farakka and its periodic reduction of water in Bangladesh 
during the dry season places immense pressure on the country‘s 
attempts to address its arsenic crisis.  It provides a significant 
disincentive to encouraging true reliance on surface water and in 
turn provides a disincentive to developing long-term mechanisms 
for purifying and delivering surface water for consumption and 
agriculture.   
In a broader context—one that informs our consideration of the 
bargaining inequities inherent between Bangladesh and India—
Farakka‘s operation began to cause severe drought in Bangladesh.  
It reduced the flow of the Ganges drastically, a phenomenon which 
adversely affected (and continues to affect) the ―hydrology, river 
morphology, agriculture, domestic and municipal water supply, 
fishery, forestry, industry, navigation, public health and 
biodiversity‖ of the country.232  It was amidst the threat of these 
outcomes (as well as during the early stages of these outcomes) 
that Bangladesh attempted to work with India—for over two 
decades—to form the Treaty. 
The first Farakka water-sharing agreement was a short-term, 
one-month arrangement in 1975, which shifted the longstanding 
controversy over whether Farakka should be built in the first place 
to determining the quantity of water to be shared during the dry 
season.233 
This shift was, in essence, coerced.  India had built the dam 
despite decades of objection from East Bengal (then Pakistan).  
Bangladesh—a young country in the awkward position of owing 
thanks to India for its help during Bangladesh‘s independence 
movement and the rebuilding period afterwards234—had little 
choice but to accept Farakka‘s existence.  All the Bangladesh 
government could hope to do was secure an assurance that it 
 
pushes Calcutta port to obsolescence.  Khan, supra note 3, at 472.  However, 
ironically, Haldia has also fallen prey to similar silting processes, due either to 
Farakka and other Indian damming practices upstream, or a generally lower-than-
expected water availability from the Ganges.  See, e.g., Silt-Choked Haldia Port Shuts 
Down, TIMES OF INDIA, Sept. 16, 2009, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india 
/Silt-choked-Haldia-port-shuts-down/articleshow/5015690.cms; Cargo Handling 
at Haldia Port to Drop by 9 MN Tonnes This Fiscal, HINDU (India), http://beta 
.thehindu.com/business/Industry/article201955.ece. 
232 Khan, supra note 3, at 473. 
233 Salman & Uprety, supra note 201, at 307. 
234 Khalid, supra note 187, at 557–58.  
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would not be entirely deprived of water when India chose to begin 
its Ganges diversions. 
The following thirsty, uncertain ―era‖ involved a purportedly 
month-long test-run of the Barrage by India that continued for two 
years, intervention by the UN (at Bangladesh‘s request) that 
resulted in a temporary sharing agreement lasting from 1977 to 
1982,235 refusal on the part of India to renew the 1977 agreement 
despite Bangladesh‘s repeated requests, two flimsier ―Memoranda 
of Understanding‖ (in 1982 and 1985) that did not safeguard 
Bangladesh‘s interests in the event of exceptionally low Ganges 
flows, and another dearth of sharing agreements for eight years 
between 1985 and late 1996.236  Throughout the pre-1996 years, on 
several occasions and for varying stretches of time, India withdrew 
significant quantities of water from upstream as needed, leaching 
Bangladesh dry.237 
Over this period, the agreements were marked by a 
systematically reduced share of water for Bangladesh.238  While 
some of this might have been attributable to the equitable 
utilization principle—which, as noted before, partially guided the 
ultimate sharing arrangements in the Ganges Treaty and 
emphasized ―distribution of resources in the manner that is most 
beneficial to all the parties involved,‖239 or, phrased differently, 
―the comprehensive best interests of both parties‖240—some 
compellingly speculate that the reduction found much of its source 
in India‘s bargaining advantages:  the country had size, military 
might, and upstream proximity in its favor.241 
 
235 See generally Agreement Between the Government of the People‘s Republic 
of Bangladesh and the Government of the Republic of India on Sharing of the 
Ganges Waters at Farakka and on Augmenting its Flows, Bangl.-India, Nov. 5, 
1977, 1066 U.N.T.S. 16 (detailing the terms of the Ganges water sharing agreement 
from 1977 to 1982). 
236 See Khan, supra note 3, at 463–69, for an in-depth review of the sequence 
of events.  See also Salman & Uprety, supra note 201, at 307–10, for a discussion of 
the early agreements on the Ganges River.  
237 See Khan, supra note 3, at 467–69. 
238 See Salman & Uprety, supra note 201, at 327 (stating that Bangladesh‘s 
share of water decreased from about 59% under the 1977 Agreement to 
approximately 52% under the present Ganges Treaty). 
239 Keene, supra note 211, at 485. 
240 Id. at 488. 
241 Id. at 499–500. 
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Note, also, the sheer amount of time it took for a long-term 
treaty to be formed—twenty-one years, from 1975 to 1996.242  Given 
that this lengthy period of time was primarily damaging to 
Bangladesh and less so (if at all) to India, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the gap was again due to the bargaining advantages 
that India possesses.  India, after all, had little interest in forming a 
sharing agreement.  In the absence of an agreement, it had free 
reign to use Farakka as it needed. 
In sum, the Ganges Treaty, while beneficial to Bangladesh, was 
forged with significant compromises on the part of Bangladesh due 
to its bargaining disadvantages.  The same problem will likely 
occur in any subsequent attempts to use solo treaty negotiations to 
secure surface water.243 
Granted, it is unnecessarily and glumly fatalistic to dismiss all 
of Bangladesh‘s attempts to negotiate with India as doomed.  There 
are ways of surmounting bargaining inequities.  We can look to 
other treaties in the region for guidance—the Indus River Treaty 
between India and Pakistan, for example.244  While the bargaining 
disparities are obviously on a different scale (Pakistan is larger, 
more developed, and more militarily-advanced than Bangladesh), 
the Indus River Treaty did find success through the use of a third-
party arbitration apparatus for the negotiation of treaty terms. 
Indeed, much of the success of the Indus River Treaty—whose 
obligations have been met by both countries for the 50 years it has 
been in effect, despite strained political relations and full-out 
war—may be attributed to the fact that the treaty negotiations were 
managed by the World Bank, an independent, theoretically 
unbiased arbitrator.245  However, an arbitrator was not employed 
 
242 Communications between the countries during this more than two-decade 
gap indicate that the delay was largely due to disagreement on flow augmentation 
plans.  See Khan, supra note 3, at 467.  Some claim India was stalling negotiations 
by insisting on the linkage of the issues of flow augmentation and flow sharing 
and predicating any long-term treaty on an augmentation scheme of India‘s 
design.  See id. at 469. 
243 See supra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing recent, albeit 
tediously slow, attempts at drafting water sharing negotiations). 
244 See generally Indus Waters Treaty 1960, India-Pak., Sept. 19, 1960, 419 
U.N.T.S. 125 (defining the terms of current water sharing treaty between India 
and Pakistan).  
245 See Subedi, supra note 184, at 953 (attributing the success of the Indus 
River Treaty to the ―wisdom and far-sightedness of [India and Pakistan‘s] political 
leaders and the constructive role of mediation and conciliation played by the 
World Bank‖).  
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for the formation of the Ganges Treaty and the lesson from the 
Treaty‘s shortcomings is worthwhile.  Bangladesh, in future 
―international‖ endeavors—such as agreements on the many 
transboundary rivers that flow from India—should avoid acting 
alone.  It should instead call upon an impartial, credible, and 
influential arbitrator to help. 
3.1.4. Insufficiency of Bilateral Treaties 
There has been a consistent cry from some experts for multi-
lateral, holistic, ―catchment-based‖ water management treaties for 
entire hydrological systems rather than reliance on simple bilateral 
treaties.  The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna river system would 
benefit from such an agreement,246 and Bangladesh would do well 
to encourage its neighbors to enter into one.  This, however, seems 
an unrealistic goal.  Bangladesh may consider making a vigorous 
effort in international arenas by approaching organizations such as 
the United Nations to bring attention to its thirsty plight, and point 
to the untold efficiencies and benefits that might arise from having 
a better treaty for the region—but that is approximately the extent 
of what it is likely to accomplish. 
The numbers support the lack of feasibility for such an 
arrangement:  in 1997, 124 of the 145 water treaties in the world 
were bilateral.247  Twenty-one of the treaties were multilateral; two 
of these multilateral treaties were ―unsigned agreements or 
drafts.‖248  Experts have attributed the lack of any real attempt to 
enter into a multilateral water management treaty to political and 
ideological differences, as well as the varying, and seemingly 
conflicting, immediate interests amongst riparian countries.249 
 
246 Potential benefits include an increased provision of hydro-electric power, 
improved navigation routes, improved water quality, and increased cooperation 
in mitigating natural disasters.  See ADB REPORT, supra note 73, at 6, para. 20. 
247 See Jesse H. Hamner & Aaron T. Wolf, Patterns in International Water 
Resource Treaties: The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, 9 COLO. J. INT‘L 
ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 157, 160 (1997) (noting that the overwhelming percentage of 
modern international water resource treaties are bilateral, as opposed to 
multilateral).  
248 Id. 
249 See Salman & Uprety, supra note 201, at 299 (noting that in spite of the 
tremendous importance of the Ganges River to the livelihood of the four riparian 
countries—India, Nepal, Bangladesh, and China—they have never entered into a 
water-sharing agreement because of political and ideological differences). 
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Earlier, an example of this was mentioned briefly250—the flow 
augmentation disagreements during the twenty-one year delay 
before the 1996 Ganges Treaty.  During this time, Bangladesh and 
India were exchanging large-scale construction proposals to 
augment the flow of the Ganges River.  India‘s proposals centered 
on the construction of a link-canal through Bangladesh territory to 
connect the Brahmaputra River with the Ganges River at a point 
above the Farakka Barrage; Bangladesh disliked these proposals, 
concerned as they were with the environmental, social, political, 
and economic impact of such a project.  More importantly, 
Bangladesh was concerned about the canal‘s potential to 
exacerbate flooding during the monsoon season.251  Bangladesh 
instead wished to build storage reservoirs in the upper reaches of 
the Ganges in India and Nepal to ―store water during the monsoon 
season for release during the dry season.‖252  India refused this 
idea outright, because it involved Nepal, which it contended was 
outside the scope of the negotiations. 
Indeed, during those two decades, whenever Bangladesh 
wanted to involve Nepal in the discussion of its proposal for 
augmentation through storage mechanisms, India avoided the 
issue by pleading bilateralism.253  One might interpret this refusal 
on the part of India to engage in multilateral negotiations as a 
strategic way to maintain its bargaining advantages.  Bilateral 
negotiation was perhaps preferred by India because it:  (a) 
prevented Nepal and Bangladesh from consolidating their 
transboundary river interests (thereby gaining more leverage 
against India); and (b) avoided the complications of articulating a 
non-contradictory, self-benefiting water sharing theory to both its 
upper and lower riparian neighbors at the same time.  Imagine 
India attempting to reconcile its stance on the sharing of the 
Mahakali River with Nepal—defending, as a lower riparian 
country, its right to use the water in accordance with its need for 
the water, where the term ―need‖ is interpreted to describe 
extensive socio-economic requirements—but denying Bangladesh, 
 
250 See supra notes 205, 242 (noting the role of augmentation in the discussions 
between Bangladesh and India, and its delaying effect upon the proceedings). 
251 See Salman & Uprety, supra note 201, at 331 (discussing India and 
Bangladesh‘s proposed plans to augment the flow of the Ganges River during the 
dry season, and the concerns that arose out of these proposals). 
252 Id. 
253 Khan, supra note 3, at 478. 
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as an upper riparian state, more generous access to the Ganges.  
This would be awkward at best; India, in short, had no immediate 
incentive to negotiate with more than one party at any given time 
(though it is worthwhile to note that recently India has seemed 
more amenable to the concept254). 
Still, the arguments in favor of a multilateral treaty are 
compelling.  International drainage basins link riparian states into 
a common and interdependent freshwater system that essentially 
connects the encompassed nations‘ respective agricultural, 
industrial, energy, and transportation sectors into an integrated 
regional unit—action by one riparian nation affects the quantity 
and quality of river water available to neighboring states, and 
imposes direct costs on other states in the basin; basin nations 
share not just a river, but also an entire ecosphere.255  While the 
potential for conflict is extremely high, so too is (as is submitted by 
some observers) the possibility and beneficial nature of 
compromise and cooperation.256 
According to some water resource experts, ignoring the 
watershed as the fundamental planning unit—where the quality 
and quantity of surface water and groundwater are all 
interrelated—ignores hydrologic reality.257  Thus, any policy 
insisting upon bilateral negotiations is not ideal.258  Some observers 
claim that neither the Ganges-Brahmaputra nor the Indus River 
systems have ever been managed to their full efficiency due to 
mentalities that ignore the fundamental nature of the watershed.259  
Another has predicted that a truly permanent solution to the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin difficulties will only occur 
after the inclusion of all the affected watercourse states in treaty 
negotiations.260 
 
254 Bangladesh Seeks Tripartite Water Talks with Nepal, India, BDNEWS24.COM 
(Bangl.), Mar. 20, 2010, http://www.bdnews24.com/details.php?id=156324 
&cid=2 (―According to a press-release issued by the Bangladesh High 
Commission in Delhi, India was agreeable to the proposal of a tripartite 
discussion [regarding incorporating Nepal into potential augmentation 
schemes].‖). 
255 Kraska, supra note 198, at 481. 
256 Id. 
257 Hamner & Wolf, supra note 247, at 160. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
260 Khalid, supra note 187, at 570. 
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3.2. India’s Inter-Basin Water Transfer Project and Upstream Dams 
Several planned actions261 by India—through their 
manipulation of surface water flows—might be threats to 
Bangladesh‘s ultimate well-being.  The largest of these is the Indian 
Inter-Basin Water Transfer Project.262  The Indian Government is in 
the planning and design stages of a massive endeavor to rearrange 
its currently uneven distribution of water in the style of the 
Farakka Barrage, except on a far larger scale.  The project, in 
addition to smaller Indian dam projects, such as the Tipaimukh 
Hydroelectric Dam on the Barak River,263 have the potential to 
 
261 See, e.g., North Eastern Electric Power Map, N.E. ELEC. POWER CORP., 
http://www.neepco.gov.in/neepco/jsps/popupimg.html?/neepco/images/nee
pcomapNew.jpg (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (depicting the locations of India‘s 
planned actions on a map); Projects to be Taken Up, N.E. ELEC. POWER CORP., 
http://www.neepco.gov.in/neepco/index.jsp (hover over ―Projects‖ hyperlink; 
then follow ―Future Projects‖ hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (listing the 
current status of projects planned for states in the North Eastern region); Projects 
Under Execution, N.E. ELEC. POWER CORP., http://www.neepco.gov.in/neepco 
/index.jsp (hover over ―Projects‖ hyperlink; then follow ―Ongoing Projects‖ 
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (providing information on various gas and 
hydro electric based projects); see also Projects List, NAT‘L HYDROELEC. POWER 
CORP., http://www.nhpcindia.com/Projects/Project_index.aspx (last visited Mar. 
15, 2011) (listing National Hydroelectric Power Corporation‘s projects by type and 
then by name). 
262 See generally Inter Basin Water Transfer: The Need, NAT‘L WATER DEV. 
AGENCY, http://nwda.gov.in/index2.asp?slid=3&sublinkid=3&langid=1 (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2011) (stating the reasons the Indian Government plans to 
redistribute water from excess areas to shortage areas and the most effective ways 
of doing so). 
263 See Welcome to Tipaimukh Project, NAT‘L HYDROELEC. POWER CORP., 
http://www.nhpcindia.com/Projects/English/Scripts/Prj_Features.aspx?Vid=16
7 (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (describing the project, as summarized by the 
implementation agency).  See generally Syed Zain Al-Mahmood, Muddying the 
Waters, STAR WEEKEND MAG. (Bangl.), July 10, 2009, http://www.thedailystar.net 
/magazine/2009/07/02/cover.htm (describing India‘s Tipaimukh dam project 
and its potential dangerous effects on Bangladesh); Mohiuddin Alamgir, 
Tipaimukh: Another Farakka in the Offing?, NEW AGE XTRA (June 12, 2009), 
http://media.causes.com/ribbon/502745 (drawing comparisons between the 
Tipaimukh Dam and the Farakka Barrage).  Some have predicted that Tipaimukh 
will have devastating, irreversible effects in Bangladesh.  See Mustafizur Rahman 
Tarafdar, Tipaimukh Dam: An Alarming Venture, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Apr. 25, 2009, 
http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=85451 (predicting environmental, 
economic, and agricultural havoc if the Tipaimukh dam is built); see also Syed 
Zain Al-Mahmood, The Dam Documents, STAR WEEKEND MAG. (Bangl.), July 24, 
2009, http://www.thedailystar.net/magazine/2009/07/04/followup.htm (noting  
inadequacies and suspect items within the published portions of the feasibility 
and impact studies).  Note, however, that India has assured Bangladesh that 
because the dam is a hydroelectric plant, it is not a danger to Bangladeshi interests 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
SARWAR.DOC 3/18/2011  9:26 PM 
890 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:3 
exacerbate Bangladesh‘s arsenic crisis by placing even more 
disincentives264 upon Bangladesh to rely on surface water.  
Bangladesh might, as a result, need to try leveraging international 
law to prevent or limit the effects of these unilateral Indian projects 
destined to affect Bangladesh‘s water supply. 
IBWT involves the diversion of water from the Ganges and the 
Brahmaputra.265  Its construction was authorized by a decision of 
the Indian Supreme Court.266  The project has two components—a 
Himalayan component that will link fourteen rivers in northern 
India, and a Peninsular component that will link sixteen rivers in 
southern India.267 
 
as it does not divert water away from the Barak River.  Tipaimukh Dam Won’t 
Harm: India, BANGL. NEWS, May 20, 2009, http://www.independent-
bangladesh.com/2009051910988/country/tipaimukh-dam-won-t-harm-
india.html. 
264 See generally Sudha Ramachandran, India, Bangladesh Fight Against the 
Current, ASIA TIMES, June 8, 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia 
/HF08Df04.html (reporting non-arsenic related difficulties that have arisen from 
India‘s use of the Farakka Barrage, including the consistent diminution of the flow 
of water into Bangladesh , and resultant concerns arising from IBWT and 
Tipaimukh). 
265 See generally Inter Basin Water Transfer: The Need, supra note 262 (describing 
potential ways to address water shortages and noting the excess of water in the 
Northern reaches of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra). 
266 See Keya Acharya, Scheme to Link Major Rivers Divides India, ENV‘T NEWS 
SERV., July 17, 2003, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jul2003/2003-07-17-
01.html (―The scheme has been given added weight by the Supreme Court of 
India which, on a public interest litigation filed by farmers from southern India 
asking the government to provide water to all, passed an Order requiring the 
project to be completed by 2016.‖); see also Ahsan, supra note 183 (relating news of 
minister-level talks between India and Bangladesh and conveying fear that India‘s 
river link project will harm Bangladesh‘s water supply).  Manoj Mitta provides a 
narrative of the series of events that led to the court pronouncement: In August 
2002, the Indian President Kalam made a ―passing‖ observation in an address to 
the nation, listing problems that required urgent attention, including uneven 
water distribution across the nation.  Manoj Mitta, The River Sutra, INDIAN EXPRESS, 
Mar. 2, 2003, http://www.indianexpress.com/oldStory/19364/.  In August 2002, 
senior advocate Ranjit Kumar filed a copy of the speech along with other 
documents to the Supreme Court on a separate matter, the clean-up of Yamuna 
River.  Id.  Chief Justice of India Kirpal responded ―so enthusiastically‖ that the 
Supreme Court converted Kumar‘s application into a writ petition and issued 
notices on the need to network rivers.  Id. 
267 NAT‘L COUNCIL OF APPLIED ECON. RESEARCH, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
INTERLINKING OF RIVERS PROGRAMME 3 (2008) (India), available at http://www 
.nwda.gov.in/writereaddata/mainlinkfile/File277.pdf; see also India’s National 
River-Linking Project: India’s River Linking Map, INT‘L WATER MGMT. INST., 
http://nrlp.iwmi.org/main/maps.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (mapping 
where rivers will be linked for the Peninsula and the Himalayan Components). 
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The Project‘s objectives, according to the Indian National Water 
Development Agency, are ―to increase the irrigation potential for 
increasing the food grain production, mitigate floods and droughts 
and reduce regional imbalance in the availability of water,‖ by 
transferring water from areas of surplus to deficit areas.268  The 
intention is to ―build storage reservoirs on these rivers and connect 
them to other parts of the country,‖ so that a ―lot of benefits by 
way of additional irrigation, domestic and industrial water supply, 
hydropower generation, navigational facilities etc. [sic] would 
accrue.‖269 
Using Farakka as a guide, it seems easy to surmise the adverse 
consequences that the Indian IBWT Project—a thorough, expensive 
redesign of natural water movement through the entire 
subcontinent—will likely have on the economy, ecology, biology, 
and sustainable development of Bangladesh.270  Among other 
projected ecological and economic effects (e.g. a crippling of 
Bangladesh‘s fishing industry271), some contend that the intrusions 
of salinity caused by the IBWT Project ―will render the ground 
water [further] contaminated and undrinkable, causing further 
scarcity in surface water.‖272  Citing studies on the potential 
impacts of the Indian IBWT Project, Shawkat Alam warns: 
The Indian River-Linking Project will irreparably alter 
natural ecosystems by an unnatural modification of the 
hydrological cycle through the use of canal systems, and it 
will seriously affect biological diversity by upsetting the 
natural equilibrium.  Such extensive geomorphic changes 
 
268 Inter Basin Water Transfer: The Need, supra note 262. 
269 Id. 
270 See Shawkat Alam, An Examination of the International Environmental Law 
Governing the Proposed Indian River-Linking Project and an Appraisal of Its Ecological 
and Socio-Economic Implications for Lower Riparian Countries, 19 GEO. INT‘L ENVTL. L. 
REV. 209, 213 (2007) (discussing the impacts of the Indian River-Linking Project). 
271 See Khalid, supra note 187, at 555. 
According to Jayanta Bandopadhya, of the Centre of Development and 
Environment Policy at the Indian Institute of Management in Kolkata, 
arresting the natural flow of rivers on a gigantic scale could sound ―the 
death knell‖ for mangroves in the delta region of West Bengal and 
Bangladesh because mangroves require the steady rise and fall of the sea 
level so that their roots can breathe.  Once this process is disrupted, the 
world could ―lose the richest fisheries in South Asia‖. [sic] 
Id. 
272 Alam, supra note 270, at 216. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
SARWAR.DOC 3/18/2011  9:26 PM 
892 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:3 
will greatly increase the probability of microbial and 
infectious diseases because of the lack of water in areas 
where it was once present, thereby increasing the already 
inadequate levels of sanitation of the malnourished and 
poverty-stricken people who will become displaced.273 
These types of conclusions are, of course, speculative.  Indeed, 
there seems to be insufficient data regarding the project itself to 
make proper conclusions; the scale of destructiveness for 
Bangladesh largely depends on how much water India intends to 
divert.  Some observers suggest that there are ways IBWT might 
actually help Bangladesh by preventing monsoon season flooding, 
provided that India draws water below a certain threshold.274 
Still, barring a change in course from India herself—which, 
granted, is entirely possible because India is quite divided about 
whether or not to proceed with the project275—Bangladesh might 
find it beneficial to look to international law to stand between 
Bangladesh and the dire consequences of the IBWT Project and 
other Indian water manipulation projects. 
 
273 Id.; see also ANIK BHADURI & B. K. ANAND, LINKING RIVERS IN THE GANGES-
BRAHMAPUTRA BASIN: EXPLORING THE TRANSBOUNDARY EFFECTS AND POSSIBILITY OF A 
WIN-WIN SITUATION 2 (2008), available at http://nrlp.iwmi.org/PDocs/DReports 
/Phase_02/04.%20Linking%20Rivers%20in%20the%20Ganges-Brahmaputra 
%20River%20Basin-Anik%20bhaduri%20et%20al.pdf (stating that above a certain 
level, diversions of large amounts of water ―could affect the ecology of the 
Brahmaputra River Basin in Bangladesh‖  and that ―there is a chance of a huge 
environmental catastrophe in Bangladesh because of the salinity ingress that 
could arise from the depletion of water in the downstream Brahmaputra‖). 
274 See generally BHADURI & ANAND, supra note 273, at 5–6 (attempting to 
model a reasonable water sharing method between Bangladesh and India—
utilizing altruism and a beneficent social planner for the entire Ganges basin—
that would result in benefits for both parties, despite the reduction in water for 
Bangladesh).  However, note that this suggestion is predicated on the amount of 
altruism India is willing to show to Bangladesh, given its own very extensive 
water needs. 
275 See Tushaar Shah, Upali Amrasinghe & Peter McCornick,  India’s River 
Linking Project: The State of the Debate, in STRATEGIC ANALYSES OF THE NATIONAL 
RIVER LINKING PROJECT (NRLP) OF INDIA SERIES 2 at 1, 10–13 (Upali A. Amarasinghe 
& Bharat R. Sharma eds., 2008) (summarizing various Indian reservations to 
engaging in a project at the scale of the proposed IBWT, including concern over 
environmental and social costs, as well as fraying political ties with India‘s 
neighbors); see also Acharya, supra note 266 (describing the mixed reactions to 
India‘s river-linking plan); M. S. Menon, A Case for Inter-Basin Transfer of Water, 
HINDU (India), Nov. 19, 2002, http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/op 
/2002/11/19/stories/2002111900130200.htm (objecting to the fears of those who 
reject the IBWT and claiming that these opponents ―have conveniently forgotten 
the benefits reaped from the past water transfers‖). 
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4. SECURING MORE SURFACE WATER 
Section 3 identified Bangladesh‘s disadvantages in its 
negotiations with India, shortcomings inherent in the Ganges 
Treaty as a result of the Farakka Barrage (and other bargaining 
inequities), as well as threats to its surface water resources that are 
on the horizon due to upcoming water diversion projects being 
implemented by India.  These issues were characterized as 
obstacles to Bangladesh‘s arsenic mitigation goal of having its 
population again rely on surface water as they effectively remove 
the most direct manner of securing more water:  treaty 
negotiations. 
Section 4 will attempt to take a brighter view on Bangladesh‘s 
plight by exploring other options.  In general, to accomplish its 
goal of reestablishing reliance on surface water, Bangladesh will 
have to find a way to (1) prevent the further loss of surface water 
and (2) acquire more surface water. 
Regarding this first objective—while, as established in Part 3, 
Bangladesh may have difficulty attempting to negotiate its way to 
more water, it may find success using international law as a 
defensive mechanism to prevent further surface water loss.  This 
section will examine ways Bangladesh may use international law 
to prevent deprivation of more water from upstream due to India‘s 
damming practices.  It will look to relief that Bangladesh might 
find under Ganges Treaty—despite its lack of an effective dispute 
resolution mechanism or its inclusion of ambiguous legal 
obligations upon both participating countries—and then turn to 
trends in international watercourse law that may help Bangladesh 
in preventing or curtailing the effects of India‘s actions, should the 
government choose to turn to the international arena for help. 
Regarding the second objective—taking a page from India‘s 
own ambitious plans, Section 4 will also look to large-scale projects 
that Bangladesh might itself pursue to attempt to leverage 
currently inefficient surface water distributions.  This section will 
advocate the benefits of such water augmentation projects and use 
India‘s example for their research and implementation, but will 
caution that their ecological and economic impact be carefully 
considered before implementation.276 
 
276 Potential large-scale projects on Bangladesh‘s horizon will not have the 
same international watercourse law implications as those called upon by India‘s 
projects.  Water diversion or storage attempts by Bangladesh will almost certainly 
have impacts on Bangladesh itself, but on some level will leave its neighbors 
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4.1. Stopping the IBWT Project 
Bangladesh, in theory, is partially protected from unilateral 
upstream water diversions under both the current treaty between 
India and Bangladesh that governs transboundary rivers and 
under principles derived from the evolving body of international 
watercourse law.  Such protections are discussed below.  Note that 
this section will focus on legal protections against the IBWT 
project, though some of the arguments can be adapted to argue 
against any unilateral upstream diversions. 
4.1.1. Securing an International Forum 
First, to articulate these legal arguments and have them be 
heard, Bangladesh would need to compel India to consider 
whether it is violating its legal obligations to Bangladesh, listen 
and find merit in Bangladesh‘s legal arguments, and alter its 
actions or agree to amend water sharing treaties accordingly.  As 
discussed previously, this will likely not occur through political 
means, given the bargaining inequities between the countries.  A 
third-party judicial organ is likely necessary, regardless of 
Bangladesh‘s goals (whether they be the reinterpretation of the 
1996 Treaty in light of emerging customary law, or the use of an 
international adjudicatory body to listen and mandate an outcome 
in a hypothetical water-sharing dispute between Bangladesh and 
India). 
This goal, unfortunately, is not easily attainable.  For example, 
Bangladesh might have considered attempting to voice its case 
before the International Court of Justice (―ICJ‖).  The ICJ serves a 
dispute settlement function for those nations declaring recognition 
of the ICJ‘s compulsory jurisdiction in relation to conflicts with any 
other State accepting the same obligation—which India has.277  
Unfortunately, Bangladesh, for any conflict with India, would not 
 
unscathed—this is a qualified blessing as a result of Bangladesh‘s status as a lower 
riparian nation. 
277 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, para. 2, June 26, 1945, 
59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993 (―The states parties to the present Statute may . . . recognize 
as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other 
state accepting the same obligation . . . .‖); see also Declaration letter from Swaran 
Singh, Minister of External Affairs, India, to Int‘l Court of Justice (Sept. 18, 1974), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 
&code=IN&PHPSEESID=45955dcbbc3178264e1ea1a7790ba97d (declaring India‘s 
recognition of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice as compulsory). 
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successfully gain an international venue by accepting compulsory 
ICJ jurisdiction because India‘s acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction 
specifically exempts itself for ―disputes with the government of 
any State which is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth of 
Nations.‖278  This exemption might be one of many reasons 
Bangladesh has not itself recognized ICJ jurisdiction (aside from 
unpredictable Bangladeshi political considerations or a decision to 
preserve sovereignty). 
4.1.2. Protections Under the 1996 Ganges Treaty 
Section 3.1.1 discusses the limited utility of the 1996 Ganges 
Treaty as a tool to compel India to enter into treaty negotiations for 
the many transboundary rivers that the respective countries share.  
Still—in the spirit of taking a brighter view on Bangladesh‘s 
plight—it is safe to say that the Ganges Treaty does not solely 
concern the Ganges River.  While, as Khalid notes, the framers of 
the Ganges Treaty likely did not have a project at the scale of the 
Indian IBWT Project in mind,279 at minimum it is arguable that the 
framers agreed to impose upon both countries some obligations 
that must be adhered to when undertaking projects that affect 
water-sharing, even if the precise extent of those obligations is 
unclear.  It seems that, by pursuing the IBWT Project without 
pursuing a new treaty agreement with Bangladesh—and without, 
some say, even formally notifying Bangladesh280—India is willfully 
 
278 Declaration letter from Swaran Singh, supra note 277, para. 2; see also id. 
para 5 (exempting India from ―disputes with regard to which any other party to a 
dispute has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice exclusively for or in relation to the purposes of such dispute . . .‖). 
279 Khalid, supra note 187, at 561. 
280 Khalid provides a narrative for Indian ―double-speak‖ in 2003 on whether 
it is actually proceeding with the River-Linking project. 
The Indian Prime Minister announced on 15 August 2003 that the project 
to link all major rivers of the country would start by the end of this year.  
A Joint River Commission Meeting was due on October 2003 and the 
Government of Bangladesh proposed to include the Project in the 
agenda.  On 30 September 2003, the Water Resources Minister of India 
informed Bangladeshi officials that its proposal to link the rivers was 
only at a ―conceptual stage‖. [sic]  Yet, following insistence from the 
Bangladeshi side, India agreed to include the issue in the agenda, though 
only under the ―miscellaneous‖ head.  In that meeting, India only 
reiterated its position by saying that the Project is still at an amorphous 
stage. 
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ignoring the pro-treaty sentiments it espoused when creating 
Article IX. 
Note how this type of argument—that is, the argument that 
India is in violation of Article IX—is not in conflict with the 
preamble‘s caveat.  Bangladesh would not be arguing a violation of 
a ―general principle of law‖ that the Ganges Treaty established, but 
rather that India is violating a specific obligation that was 
bargained for and included plainly in the treaty.  Similarly, 
Bangladesh would not be arguing that the Treaty somehow created 
some implicit legal ―precedent‖ to which India did not specifically 
agree when signing the treaty; it instead would point to the clause 
as an explicit present requirement that was set forth and agreed to 
by both parties. 
Khalid also suggests that the Treaty and the Indian IBWT 
Project cannot coexist because the IBWT Project intends to divert 
water from the Ganges before it reaches the point where water 
allocations are measured—thus, as he puts it, ―proper 
implementation of the Treaty does not allow such a [water 
diversion] project[,] and the [Indian River-Linking] Project, if 
implemented, would make the Treaty completely irrelevant.‖281  
While Khalid does not flesh out this argument, we can perhaps try 
to build one that stems from the ―lucky‖ fact that India decided to 
locate the Farakka Barrage so close to the Bangladeshi border 
(―below‖ much of its hydrological system) and agreed that that 
point was where water allocations would be measured.282  
 
Id.  Since then, India has made rather grandiose assurances that IBWT, if 
implemented, will not harm Bangladesh. 
Dasmunshi reiterated New Delhi‘s assurance that India would not 
implement any project that might create any problems within India or 
for Bangladesh.  ―Before affecting Bangladesh, this project will affect 
West Bengal and Assam,‖ he said, adding, ―it would not be implemented 
in 2000 years.‖ 
Reddy, supra note 220. 
281 Khalid, supra note 187, at 561. 
282 1996 Ganges Treaty, supra note 30, Annexure I.  See the full ―formula‖ 
below: 
ANNEXURE-I 
Availability at Farakka Share of India Share of Bangladesh 
70,000 cusecs or less 50% 50% 
70,000 – 75,000 cusecs Balance of flow 35,000 cusecs 
75,000 cusecs or more 40,000 cusecs Balance of flow 
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First, note that for the period of March 1 to May 10 every year, 
the Treaty splits the Ganges flow not into percentages but respective 
absolute measures of water volume owed to each country.283  While 
it has already been discussed how these volumes might have been 
grossly underestimated, it is worthwhile to note that India, by not 
providing these volumes during these months under ―natural‖ 
circumstances out of its control, would be in violation of the Treaty 
only because it is impossible to fulfill the conditions of the Treaty.  
The story changes, however, if India cannot fulfill the Treaty by 
causing the water to be unavailable to Bangladesh through 
upstream diversions.  In this situation, it would be directly acting 
such that the terms of the Treaty—Article II(i) in conjunction with 
Annexures I and II284—cannot be fulfilled.  Therefore, it would be 
implicitly violating the 1996 Treaty. 
Further, it could also be argued that India is explicitly violating 
Article II(ii) of the 1996 Treaty, which states in relevant part:  
―[e]very effort would be made by the upper riparian to protect 
flows of water at Farakka as in the 40-years average availability as 
mentioned above.‖285  The Indian IBWT project actively shirks this 
responsibility.  The language is admittedly broad; however, it is 
fairly clear on plain reading that the Indian IBWT project would 
hardly qualify as ―every effort‖ to ―protect flows‖ on the part of 
India. 
Finally, Bangladesh can bolster its arguments with respect to 
violations of the 1996 Treaty by pointing to the repeated inclusions 
of a ―no harm‖ principle alongside an ―equitable use‖ principle,286 
and using that repetition to suggest that India agreed—for, at 
minimum, the Ganges—to avoid engaging in watercourse practices 
harmful to its lower riparian neighbor.  The benefits of equating 
these principles were discussed in Section 3.1.1 and the individual 
 
Subject to the condition that India and Bangladesh each shall receive 
guaranteed 35,000 cusecs of water in alternate three 10-day periods 
during the period of March 1 to May 10.   
Id. 
283 Id. art. II. 
284 See id. Annexure-II.  Annexure II is an ―indicative schedule‖ based on 40 
years (1949-1988) of data of the average availability of water at Farakka for 10-day 
periods. 
285 Id. art. II(ii). 
286 Id. arts. II, IX, X. 
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principles and their legitimacy will be touched upon in Section 
4.1.3. 
4.1.3. Regulation of International Rivers and Recent Trends 
Principles that attempt to tackle the problems of resolving 
conflicts between co-riparian water users have been developed 
over the course of centuries by lawmakers and scholars.  As of this 
writing, no active convention or treaty applies directly to 
Bangladesh‘s plight in the face of India‘s upstream IBWT project 
(aside, potentially, from the 1996 Ganges Treaty itself, as discussed 
in Section 4.1.2).287  Thus, it might be useful to examine water 
regulation principles that have arisen over the centuries and glean 
the direction in which they flow with respect to acceptance by the 
international community.  These principles—arising both from 
multilateral agreements and soft-law instruments—pertain to 
transboundary rivers and might prove useful to Bangladesh in 
crafting legal arguments in an international forum. 
At minimum, it is clear that the old principle of absolute 
territorial sovereignty over rivers, a concept favoring upper riparian 
state rights and articulated by Grotius as ―the property of the 
people through whose territory it flows‖ has been largely 
abandoned.288  As evidence of this, Alam points to the adoption of 
a more equitable distribution of rights in treaties entered into by 
various upper riparian nations such as the United States, Austria, 
and India.289  The principle‘s waning acceptance is also evident in 
decisions by international juridical bodies, which have rejected the 
position290 as evident in the 1941 Trail Smelter Arbitration291 and the 
1949 ICJ Corfu Channel case.292 
 
287 Note, however, that Bangladesh can call upon separate obligations to 
which India has agreed—by virtue of India‘s various multilateral treaty 
memberships—and claim that India would violate those obligations if it proceeds 
with its upstream damming projects.  These include obligations under the London 
Convention Related to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State, 
the Rome International Plant Protection Convention, the World Heritage 
Convention, and the Convention of Migratory Species.  See Alam, supra note 270, 
at 230 (enumerating multilateral commitments made by India that the damming 
project would theoretically violate). 
288 Id. at 220. 
289 See Alam, supra note 270, at 220–21.  (discussing changing customs and 
principles in international water law as reflected by treaty). 
290 See Khalid, supra note 187, at 563 (noting a shift in customs and principles 
in international water law as defined by international judicial bodies). 
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It is also clear that the conceptual ―opposite,‖ the principle of 
absolute territorial integrity—which requires upper riparian 
countries to utilize a river resource in such a manner so as not to 
affect the flow of the river to lower riparian countries—is similarly 
inapplicable, as it never took hold in the international realm.293   
Two principles more readily embraced by modern 
international law are also embraced by the Ganges Treaty itself:  
the obligation not to inflict appreciable harm (or the “no harm” 
principle noted in Section 3.1.1) and the equitable use principle 
(noted in Section 3.1.2).  The former imposes an obligation not to 
use, or to allow the use of, territory for acts contrary to the rights of 
other states and has appeared in various soft-law instruments.294  
This doctrine is beneficial to Bangladesh as it obliges riparians to 
consider the effects their actions have on co-riparians, instead of 
ignoring them and pursuing projects under the theory of state 
sovereignty.295 
The latter—the widely-held doctrine of reasonable and 
equitable use—establishes that states shall optimally, equitably, 
 
291 Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), Decision, 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (Trial 
Smelter Arb. Trib 1938). 
292 Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9). 
293 See Khalid, supra note 187, at 563 (―This principle states that lower riparian 
states have the right to the continuous or natural flow of a river flowing from 
upper riparian states.‖). 
294 See, e.g., Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment, supra note 187, at 4.  The Stockholm Declaration emphasized that 
although states are allowed to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, they have the responsibility to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction do not cause damage to other states; this concept has 
appeared in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1992 
Convention on Biological Diversity, and the 2002 Johannesburg Earth Summit.  
Alam, supra note 270, at 218.  But see CHARLES B. BOURNE, The International Law 
Commission’s Draft Articles on the Law of International Watercourses: Principles and 
Planned Measures, in INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR 
CHARLES B. BOURNE 83, 98–103 (Patricia Wouters ed., 1997) (describing how the 
principle of no harm directly contradicts the principle of equitable utilization and 
questioning the principle‘s status as customary law by criticizing the use of the 
Trail Smelter, Corfu Channel, and Lac Lanoux cases as legitimate ―precedent‖ for the 
no harm principle). 
295 The old principle of state sovereignty has also been limited over the years. 
Alam points to the implicit restraints found within UN Charter itself, which 
requires participants to give due account to the well-being of its fellow nations in 
social, economic, and commercial matters.  Alam, supra note 270, at 218; U.N. 
Charter art. 55. 
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and reasonably utilize the watercourse in their respective 
territories296; this principle merits some discussion. 
The principle was articulated by the 1966 Helsinki Rules on the 
Uses of Waters of International Rivers,297 a document that was 
produced by the International Law Association and not bolstered 
by the weight of any intergovernmental body; it was revised and 
updated in the 2004 Berlin Rules on Water Resources.298  The 
principle was also incorporated into the 1997 Watercourse 
Convention.299 
India, in some ways, leans on the principle of equitable use, 
which allows for the use of watercourses according to a country‘s 
need.  This leaning is evident from India‘s negotiations during the 
formation of the Mahakali and Ganges Treaties, where it often 
used its need as a justification for its positions, defining ―need‖ to 
 
296 See supra notes 206–13 and accompanying text (discussing India‘s 
watercourse management in wet and dry seasons and its effect on Bangladesh, as 
well as the doctrine of equitable use generally). 
297 See Int‘l Law Ass‘n, Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, 52 INT‘L L. 
ASS‘N REP. CONF. 447, 486 (1966) (―Each basin State is entitled, within its territory, 
to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an 
international drainage basin.‖).   
298 See Int‘l Law Ass‘n, Berlin Conference on Water Resources Law: Fourth Report, 
71 INT‘L LAW ASS‘N REP. CONF. 334, 361 (2004).  Interestingly, the principle of 
equitable utilization is prefaced by an articulation of the no harm principle noted 
before: 
1. Basin States shall in their respective territories manage the waters of an 
international drainage basin in an equitable and reasonable manner 
having due regard for the obligation not to cause significant harm to 
other basin States. 
2. In particular, basin States shall develop and use the waters of the basin 
in order to attain the optimal and sustainable use thereof and benefits 
therefrom, taking into account the interests of other basin States, 
consistent with adequate protection of the waters.   
Id. 
299 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, arts. 5–7, supra note 189.  The Convention requires 35 ratification 
documents to come into force.  Id. art. 36(1).  Note that Bangladesh voted for 1997 
Watercourse Convention but India abstained from voting.  Khalid, supra note 187, 
at 562.  The convention has not yet accumulated 35 ratification documents.  Id.  
This obviously reduces the applicability of the 1997 Watercourse Convention, 
especially given the following argument which one observer raises: because the 
Convention is looked upon with particular suspicion and given particular 
disregard in the South and East Asian regions, its applicable principles are 
rendered suspect.  Erica J. Thorson, Sharing Himalayan Glacial Meltwater: The Role of 
Territorial Sovereignty, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT‘L L. 487, 510-11 (2009). 
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include its population‘s significant ―socio-economic 
requirements.‖300  This utilization of the doctrine has been decried 
by some observers as unreasonable and contrary to the doctrine‘s 
goal of efficiency.301  As noted by Alam: 
[India‘s] aggressive pursuit of economic prosperity while 
maintaining . . . unsustainable consumptive patterns, 
through the diversion and damming of environmental 
flows . . . requires even greater diversions of water to meet 
present needs.  Hence, the traditional doctrine of equitable 
use actually results in increased waste, as the supposedly 
―optimal and reasonable use‖ for the further development 
of water resources has often been based on little more than 
the supply that is needed to prop up existing inefficiencies 
in water transmission and usage.302 
Thus, under a sophisticated interpretation of the equitable use 
doctrine that takes into account the doctrine‘s goals, India‘s 
attempted justifications might ring hollow.303 
The 1997 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros decision of the ICJ illustrates this 
in a way and might be of particular interest to Bangladesh because 
of its commentary relating to the equitable use of transboundary 
watercourses.  The dispute was regarding the use of the Danube 
River.304  One of the parties in the case, Czechoslovakia, was 
attempting to build a dam, which had the possibility of wreaking 
environmental havoc on Hungary.305 
 
300 Salman & Uprety, supra note 201, at 300. 
301 Alam, supra note 270, at 223. 
302 Id. 
303 There is support for this contention in the soft-law instruments previously 
mentioned.  The 1997 Watercourse Convention—which can be characterized as an 
advocate of the equitable use doctrine—takes pains to include in Article 7 the 
principle of ―no significant harm.‖  Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, supra note 189.  Recall that this 
was also the case in the Berlin Rules.  See Int‘l Law Ass‘n, supra note 298.  This 
suggests that, on some level, ―no harm‖ is increasingly being folded into the 
concept of ―equitable utilization.‖  Granted, as discussed in note 299, neither 
Bangladesh nor India are bound by the 1997 Watercourse Convention, but this at 
minimum is a persuasive indication that India‘s no-holds-barred interpretation of 
the equitable use doctrine that allows unfettered unilateral rearrangements of a 
complex water system is contrary to emerging international legal obligations. 
304 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, para. 16 
(Sept. 25). 
305 Id. para. 53. 
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The ICJ affirmed that Hungary and Czechoslovakia each had 
an equal right to the benefits of the Danube‘s water resources, 
including the use of the water for hydropower, recreational 
enjoyment, fisheries, and other benefits.306  In arriving at this 
conclusion, the Court noted that both Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia enjoyed a customary right ―to an equitable and 
reasonable sharing of the resources of an international 
watercourse.‖307 
For Bangladesh‘s purposes, ICJ provided guidelines in relation 
to the use and ownership of shared water resources.308  It notably 
used the principle of equitable use against the violating riparian.  In 
deciding the effect of the construction of the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros dam project on the Danube, it held that 
Czechoslovakia, by unilaterally assuming jurisdiction over a 
shared watercourse, deprived Hungary of its right to an equitable 
and reasonable share of the natural resources and consequently 
failed to respect established principles of international law.309  
Alam views the ICJ‘s judgment in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros as 
strengthening the claims of downstream states such as 
Bangladesh.310  Its holding strongly suggests that India‘s proposed 
solution to the issue of droughts and floods as it strives to attain 
economic growth—via assertion of ownership of the waters and 
reallocation of water unfettered by sufficient concern for the 
ecological integrity of the environment—is disallowed under 
international law,311 or at the very least, becoming less accepted 
under international law.  
There are other fledgling doctrines that merit mention, as they 
might help Bangladesh argue regarding the emergence of trends in 
customary international law that militate against the legality of the 
Indian IBWT Project. 
Generally speaking, there appears to be a trend in the 
international sphere towards recognizing the need for a ―holistic‖ 
management of global environmental resources—a need which 
 
306 Id. para. 85; Thorson, supra note 299, at 502. 
307 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, para. 78 
(Sept. 25). 
308 See generally Alam, supra note 270, at 227. 
309 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, para. 85 
(Sept. 25). 
310 See generally Alam, supra note 270, at 227. 
311 Id. at 229. 
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was articulated in the Rio Declaration.312  The Rio Declaration 
emphasizes long-term development of global freshwater resources 
with an understanding of the ―interconnectedness of the elements 
related to freshwater and freshwater quality.‖313  The Declaration 
specifically notes that the organic unity of river systems ―demands 
that freshwater management be holistic‖314—dealing with the 
entire river basin and not just the portions of the river within a 
country‘s borders.315  Bangladesh can leverage this type of trend to 
argue that the Indian IBWT Project fails to consider the harms that 
it will likely inflict on the rest of the Ganges River System.316 
This is similar to the ―community of interest‖ theory, which is a 
modification of the equitable use doctrine that ignores national 
boundaries to treat an entire transboundary water resource as a 
single economic and geographic entity, and has found some 
traction in the slowly developing field of international 
groundwater law.317  The ICJ, meanwhile, has articulated a vague 
and broad ―precautionary principle‖ which holds states to the 
general obligation of ensuring that activities within their control 
respect the environments of other states.318  The International Law 
Commission of the UN has drafted procedural obligations for 
states engaging in activities that create a risk of causing significant 
transboundary harm.  This, in a sense, may be the beginning of a 
trend towards recognizing a duty to cooperate with other countries 
in mitigating transboundary risks.319  If they develop further, all of 
these international law principles will likely aid Bangladesh in a 
hypothetical dispute or in the imposition of preventative legal 
obligations by the 1996 Ganges Treaty. 
 
312 Id. at 219. 
313 Id. at 219 (citing United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 13–14, 1992, Resolutions Adopted by the 
Conference, 18.36, U.N. Doc A/CONF 151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1) (1993)). 
314 Id. 
315 Id. at 219–20. 
316 Bangladesh can also leverage this type of trend to argue the need of a 
multilateral treaty.  See discussion supra Section 3.1.4. 
317 Khalid, supra note 187, at 564. 
318 Id. 
319 Id. 
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4.2. Independent Surface Water Augmentation Plans 
The previous sections outline the obstacles Bangladesh faces in 
attempting to secure more surface water from its upper riparian 
neighbors.  Bilateral negotiations feature cripplingly large 
bargaining inequities, which Bangladesh might minimize by 
insisting upon a third-party entity to help arbitrate discussions. 
There are, meanwhile, practical roadblocks to an ideal multi-lateral 
treaty and centuries might transpire while waiting for such pleas to 
come to fruition.  If anything, Bangladesh might be able to leverage 
international law to prevent further deprivations of surface water as 
long as it manages to articulate its legal arguments before an 
independent juridical organ, though this too leaves an awful lot to 
chance and faith.  Thus, in the meantime, Bangladesh might do 
better to look within for solutions to its water shortages.  The final 
portion of this discussion will scrutinize Bangladesh‘s efforts at 
pursuing internal surface water augmentation plans, and examine 
why they have yet to garner any actual results. 
The acquisition of more surface water requires a creative and 
concerted effort that is focused inward.  Bangladesh will need to 
borrow ideas from its neighbors (such as India) who are facing 
similar (though not identical) challenges, in providing sufficient 
quantities of clean water for their populations, and adapt these 
solutions for its own plight. 
Bangladesh can, for example, follow India‘s lead and 
incentivize installations of rainwater collectors on buildings in 
urban areas.  It can research and develop its own barrages to try 
leveraging its monsoon season excesses for the benefit of its 
drought seasons.  If Bangladesh is able to ―get its act together‖ and 
take significant steps towards augmenting surface water sources 
on its own, it will have a considerably easier time addressing its 
arsenic problems. 
Indeed, it is likely that Bangladesh will have a chance for 
success in addressing its arsenic mitigation woes only after it 
pursues internal surface water augmentation strategies.  Only then 
can it design and implement purification mechanisms for surface 
water and lure its population away from the poisonous 
groundwater.  Note that doing so would not likely violate any 
international obligations (Bangladesh is the ―lowest‖ riparian in 
the Ganges basin, and thus would have minimal effect on its 
neighbors), and would constitute a positive trend towards self-
reliance (which is necessary due to the bargaining inequities that 
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Bangladesh faces).  Yet, it will also require, on the part of 
Bangladesh, (1) an earnest and vigorous solicitation of foreign aid 
coupled with (2) a good-faith effort to cut corrupt misallocation of 
funds and (3) the encouragement of long-term individual political 
commitment to whatever large-scale engineering projects it 
chooses.  It can thereby earn foreign trust and, in turn, secure more 
funding. 
This has not happened yet.  Some of the reasons for this were 
examined in Section 2.1.  The Government is not solely to blame, as 
it is consistently dealt a particularly difficult hand filled with 
natural disasters, continued poverty, and giant developing 
neighbors. 
Still, the lack of progress on large-scale efforts at surface water 
augmentation is frustrating.  ―Since 1963, Bangladesh (then East 
Pakistan) has sought to build a barrage . . . to store the wet season 
flow of the Ganges for use during the dry season.‖320  While India 
initially opposed this plan—largely because of the barrage‘s 
proposed location and concerns over the effects on India’s 
environment—it has since come around and approved its 
building.321 
Land was bought and a stone foundation built for the project as 
early as 1980.322  However, the various governments since then 
have failed to act.323 
A feasibility study was conducted in 1997, which enumerated 
the plan‘s potential positive effects (increased water flow, reduced 
saline intrusion, irrigation help in the southwest, and prevention of 
flooding in Bangladesh).324  Experts predicted that if the barrage 
were built, it would increase navigability of the rivers in the region 
and ultimately save the Sundarbans.325  The plan would essentially 
 
320 See generally Salman & Uprety, supra note 201, at 333. 
321 See id. (discussing India‘s initial opposition to Bangladesh‘s water 
preservation plans).  
322  See Dhaka May Build Barrage on Ganga, TURKMENISTAN NEWS.NET, Feb. 25, 
2009,  http://www.turkmenistannews.net/story/470913 (discussing the need for 
Bangladesh to complete the Ganga Barrage Project); Pinaki Roy, Rivers Dying as 
Ganges Project Remains in Limbo, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 26, 2008, 
http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=20633. 
323 See Roy, supra note 322 (highlighting the failure of the Bangladeshi 
Government by neither completing the Ganga Barrage Project nor making any 
significant progress toward its completion). 
324 See Salman & Uprety, supra note 201, at 334 (discussing the optimization of 
water usage potentially realizable through completion of the Ganga Barrage). 
325 See generally Roy, supra note 322. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
SARWAR.DOC 3/18/2011  9:26 PM 
906 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:3 
leverage the flood-excesses and attempt to redistribute the water to 
the areas of Bangladesh suffering from consistent drought.  In 1999, 
formal funding was requested for the project from the Asia 
Development Bank and other international organizations.  Even 
India offered to help with the technical aspects of the barrage.326 
Yet, the structure remains un-built.  Six years later, following 
WARPO recommendations in 2005, the government took 
initiatives327 to appoint consultants for a new feasibility study.328  It 
is unclear whether this feasibility study took place and no action 
has followed from the government. 
In 2009, there was a renewed flurry of activity regarding 
surface water augmentation plans.  In April, the finance ministry 
committee approved the selection of a consulting firm to carry out 
a new “feasibility and detailed engineering model study‖ of the 
barrage.329  In May, the $4 million dollar feasibility study was 
approved.330  In July, Bangladesh sought ―$1.4 billion to implement 
the Ganges Barrage Project, and $88.12 million for restoration of 
the flow of the Buriganga River and for a project for prevention of 
river pollution‖ from China.331 
While these seem like steps in the direction of actual 
construction, it is unclear whether the project will actually come to 
fruition, or whether this is merely political posturing by the 
government that is currently in power. 
 
326 Salman & Uprety, supra note 201, at 334. 
327 See generally MINISTRY OF WATER RES., BANGL. WATER DEV. BD., TERMS OF 
REFERENCE FOR FEASIBILITY STUDY AND DETAILED ENGINEERING OF GANGES BARRAGE 
PROJECT (2005).  
328 See Roy, supra note 322 (noting that the Bangladeshi Government has 
hired consultants for a feasibility study of the engineering planning and 
environmental impacts of a Ganges Barrage, and has even opened an office to 
examine the ―Feasibility of Ganges Barrage Project‖). 
329 See Mirza Ahsan, Dhaka Firm Seeks 3 Nations’ Help to Design Ganga Barrage, 
A PAK. NEWS, Apr. 10, 2009, http://www.apakistannews.com/dhaka-firm-seeks-
3-nations-help-to-design-ganga-barrage-114144 (discussing the solicitation of 
design support from Australia, Pakistan, and China in completion of the Ganga 
Barrage Project). 
330 See Deal Signed for Feasibility Study on Ganges Barrage, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), 
May 7, 2009, http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid 
=87156 (discussing the finalization of a deal to conduct a feasibility study for the 
Ganga Barrage Project). 
331 See Bangladesh to Seek $4.68 Bn Assistance from China, LIVEMINT.COM, July 
27, 2009, http://www.livemint.com/2009/07/27142527/Bangladesh-to-seek-468-
bn-as.html (discussing the aid package solicited by Bangladesh from China in 
support of various infrastructure projects). 
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It is commendable that the Bangladesh government is acting 
with caution; perhaps the decades of effort—and delay—are to 
ensure that any surface water augmentation plan is safe for the 
environment and relatively free of long-term ecological and 
economic side effects.  Bangladesh‘s fragile hydrology, after all, 
may not be able to survive too many more detrimental pressures.  
It is, however, doubtful that the decades of delay are the result of 
ecological trepidation.  Publicity stunts and general political 
inaction in the absence of progressive vision might be at play. 
Self-sufficient projects like the Ganga Barrage are the key to 
acquiring sufficient surface water and easing pressure on 
Bangladesh‘s arsenic mitigation attempts.  Bangladesh will not lift 
itself out of its poisonous dilemma unless it takes decisive action to 
study the feasibility of the barrage, determines ways to minimize 
the negative effects that it might have on the country, acquires 
money for its construction—solicited from entities like the World 
Bank or the Asian Development Bank, both of which have shown 
considerable generosity in the past—and builds a solution to its 
surface water crisis. 
Only then will it free itself from arsenic. 
5. CONCLUSION 
A thorough examination of Bangladesh‘s arsenic crisis reveals a 
multi-layered problem without an easy solution.  Significant 
challenges arise from attempts to leverage theoretically ample 
groundwater and surface water resources. 
Groundwater is easily available, but poisonous and difficult to 
purify for consumption.  It is tempting for agricultural use, but the 
negative impact that this use has on the soil is a devastating and 
distant-seeming to unaware users.  Surface water, meanwhile, is 
polluted and—due in part to upper riparian practices—inconstant; 
surface water drowns Bangladesh during monsoons and leaves 
Bangladesh parched during dry seasons.  Addressing these 
challenges requires both reform of internal government policies 
and leveraging international law. 
The Bangladeshi Government needs to address the stagnation 
of large-scale water management projects that fail to succeed 
despite significant investment from outside entities.  It needs to 
enact policies that preserve project-related job security despite 
political turmoil; this type of action may also discourage funding 
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misallocations, corruption, and ineffectiveness, as it could force 
individual interests to coincide with the project‘s interests. 
Part of this high-level stagnation can also be addressed by 
fixing the systemic misdirection that has plagued mitigation 
attempts.  To refocus the mitigation process, the government 
should update its national standard for acceptable arsenic 
consumption; this will help reveal the scope of the country‘s true 
need for non-groundwater solutions.  The Government should also 
update its Implementation Plan for Arsenic Mitigation with cost-
sharing provisions for installations and payment for caretakers.  It 
should include in this plan a more realistic estimate of the number 
of families that should be served by individual technology 
implementations, and update its recommendations on technology 
that should be used based on data that have been gathered 
regarding their efficacy. 
Bangladesh should consolidate and codify its water 
management policies into a binding, enforceable water act that 
imposes negative consequences upon local governments, as well as 
implementing agencies, for failure to adhere to water laws.  
Bangladesh should also pass a groundwater act that limits tube-
well drilling, ensures adequate replenishment of aquifers through 
the protection of wetlands, and encourages studies to determine 
the geologic feasibility of deep tube-well installations.  The 
government needs to find ways to enforce its water laws by 
granting rewards for adherence and imposing penalties for 
derogations.  To do so, it should borrow strategies applied by its 
neighbors, like India. 
To improve its current arsenic mitigation efforts, the 
government should set up—or revamp—a centralized monitoring 
system that keeps track of technology implementations and their 
functional status.  It should take stronger measures encouraging 
rainwater as a solution—and overcoming the cultural resistance to 
rainwater—by amending national building laws and zoning codes 
to require its use.  It should also, on a national level, require 
incentives and job security for the caretakers of water installations.  
Without mandates on a national level, it is unlikely that state 
governments or local governments will spontaneously enact such 
measures. 
In short, Bangladesh, from the perspective of policy reform and 
the correction of the current systemic misdirection, needs to, on a 
national level, discourage short-term alternative safe water sources 
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and encourage the development of long-term solutions that 
consider the total water resources of the country. 
This is especially true due to the fact that the country‘s soil—
and thus its agriculture—is being poisoned.  Getting people to stop 
drinking tube-well water is necessary but insufficient; the 
government needs to find a way to stop them from using it to 
irrigate crops. 
To do so, it will need to secure a more constant source of 
surface water so that entities can rely upon sufficient quantity to 
improve quality.  Surface water is needed.  If Bangladesh is to rely 
more on surface water, it needs to turn to international law.  This is 
especially necessary given India‘s looming Indian Inter-Basin 
Water Transfer Project, which threatens to further deplete 
Bangladesh surface water resources. 
Any goal to obtain water from transboundary rivers via 
political negotiations is unfortunately complicated.  The Ganges 
Treaty‘s formation—as well as the impotence of its dispute 
resolution mechanisms—indicates that pure one-on-one 
negotiations are insufficient to protect Bangladesh‘s interests.  The 
uneven bargaining positions of India and Bangladesh necessitate 
securing an unbiased, independent body to serve as mediator in 
any disputes that may arise.  This type of body is likely necessary, 
not only for new treaty negotiations and resolving disputes arising 
from existent treaties, but also for situations in which Bangladesh 
actively seeks to prevent the further loss of water.   
For non-treaty-negotiation and non-dispute-resolution 
purposes, Bangladesh would need to gain an independent venue 
for articulating its legal arguments; in such a venue, it can wield 
international law. 
And in such a venue, it can find support to stop the Indian 
IBWT Project by using the Ganges Treaty.  It can point to Indian 
obligations in the Ganges Treaty related to the preservation of the 
river flows.  It can insist that the Ganges Treaty requires India and 
Bangladesh to treat the customary international ―no harm rule‖ as 
importantly as the ―reasonable and equitable use rule,‖ and thus 
argue against future unilateral water diversion practices that harm 
Bangladesh.  Bangladesh can also contend that projects like the 
Indian IBWT Project would illegally render the Ganges Treaty 
irrelevant by reducing the overall quantity of water bound for 
Bangladesh at a point above the Farakka Barrage. 
Bangladesh can also argue that there are trends in international 
watercourse law that indicate that the principle of absolute state 
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sovereignty is subject to legal restraints and emerging legal 
principles, such as the need to manage and alter water resources 
through a consideration of hydrological systems as a whole.  These 
trends in customary international law have been demonstrated by 
United Nations soft-law declarations and have cropped up—in 
limited magnitude—in international court decisions, like 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros.  These arguments can be leveraged against 
the many Indian upstream damming projects that are planned and 
currently underway. 
In conjunction with these defensive measures to prevent 
projects like the Indian IBWT Project, Bangladesh should look to 
large-scale projects that attempt to leverage currently inefficient 
surface water distributions across the nation.  Surface water 
augmentation projects like the Ganga Barrage should be pursued, 
with appropriate and careful consideration of their potential 
ecological and economic impacts.  Bangladesh will need to study 
the feasibility of such barrages, determine ways to minimize the 
negative effects that they might have on the country, and acquire 
money for their construction by soliciting funding from the World 
Bank or the Asian Development Bank.   
Once it manages that, it should go beyond merely painting the 
poisonous wells installed by UNICEF and other well-meaning 
entities—it should destroy them. 
These steps and recommendations will not solve Bangladesh‘s 
arsenic problem.  However, they may help.  
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